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Presentation
EXCERPTA E DISSERTATIONIBUS IN PHILOSOPHIA
Abstract: This research work focuses on the First Prin-
ciples of the Metaphysics of Creation in the writings of 
St. Thomas Aquinas. We establish the Principle of the 
Metaphysical Act as the First Principle of the Metaphys-
ics of Creation through the study of various Aristotle’s 
axioms in order to demonstrate that the concept of cre-
ation is metaphysical. The present-day study regarding 
the origin of the Universe is extensively oriented towards 
the rationality of the material nature. It is falsely con-
cluded that the material or visible world is the ultimate 
explanation of all reality. In this light, Cosmological 
Science interprets the metaphysical notion of creatio 
ex nihilo as that which affirms that the World origi-
nates from «nothing» which is absurd because it is well 
known that nothing can come from nothing. So as to 
arrive at the Principle of Free and Intelligent Creation, 
we have brought into our consideration the idea of the 
Transcendental Good especially in Neo-Platonism. The 
Avicenna thesis of the necessary emanation of the Uni-
verse from God has also been of interest. This is because 
Aquinas heavily borrows from the mentioned schools of 
thought. Our research work also analyses the relation 
that exists between the Divine Being and the created 
being. The notion of relation in the Metaphysics of Cre-
ation is, in our view, a First Principle because it explains 
the relationship that subsists between the two very dis-
tinct acts of being. Indeed, the very rationale of creatio 
ex nihilo is the basis of the real relation that any creature 
possesses with respect to God.
Key words: the act of being; Intelligence, free will; 
Relation.
Resumen: Este trabajo se centra en los primeros 
principios de la metafísica de la creación sobre todo 
en el pensamiento de santo Tomás de Aquino. Se 
establece el principio del acto de ser como primer 
principio de la metafísica de la creación, analizan-
do varios axiomas para demostrar que la noción de 
la creación es propiamente metafísica. Los estudios 
actuales del origen del mundo versan sobre todo en 
la racionalidad de la materia del mundo. En esta ra-
cionalidad resta toda explicación sobre lo que es, eso 
es lo que tiene ser. En la misma línea la ciencia cos-
mológica ha llegado a interpretar –erróneamente– la 
idea metafísica de creatio ex nihilo como aquella que 
afirma que el mundo proviene no de la nada sino de 
nada. Para alcanzar el principio de la creación libre e 
inteligente que es el segundo principio de la metafí-
sica de la creación, hemos considerado el concep-
to del bien trascendental en el neo-platonismo y la 
tesis de la creación necesaria en el pensamiento de 
Avicena. Tanto el neo-platonismo como la visón de 
Avicena aportan de modo significativo a la reflexión 
de santo Tomás. El presente trabajo también trata de 
la asociación que subsiste entre el ser divino y el ser 
creado. La noción de la relación en la metafísica de 
la creación es un primer principio porque es la noción 
que sostiene el vínculo entre dos actos de seres radi-
calmente distintos.  En efecto, la misma racional de la 
creación ex nihilo es el fundamento de la relación real 
que existe en la criatura.
Palabras clave: el acto de ser; inteligencia; libertad; 
relación.
The present Abstract of the Doctorate Dissertation titled: «The Metaphysics 
of the Divine Creation: A consideration of the First Principles of Creation in 
Aquinas» contains excerpts from the three different chapters of the Disserta-
tion. We have decided to combine all the chapters partially selecting certain 
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sections from each. We have, for example, omitted the historical overview of 
the origin of the Universe, the concepts of Causality and the notion of creatio 
ex nihilo. Though historical development of the notion of Creation is impor-
tant for the coherence of the entire Dissertation, the Abstract can do away 
with it without losing the general logic of the research.
At a preliminarily consideration of the Universal reality in pursuit of 
the Truth, action or movement is what calls the attention of inquisitive man 
to ask: How and why do things move? It is this very question that defines the 
principal philosophical debate at the nativity of this science. This question 
is intimately associated with the One-Multiple Dialectic that defines the 
Philosophical Inquest into the original cause of the Universe. Indeed, the 
Universal Movement is what characterises the diversity of the material ex-
istence as we know it. The definitive basis of this movement is therefore 
generally considered the ultimate rational justification of the original cause 
of the Universe. The debate regarding the study of the Universal Movement 
remains as compelling today as ever. The reason for this is that the decisive 
original foundation of reality provides enlightening insights into the Notion 
of the Divine Creation –the true and appropriate description of the univer-
sal origin or reality– 1.
Contemporary studies robustly reveal the rationality of the material con-
stitution of the Universe. So articulate is this revelation that the Cosmological 
Science simply cannot concur with the incorrectly-interpreted metaphysical 
idea of creatio ex nihilo which affirms that the World originates from nothing-
ness 2. Nevertheless, the Aquinas recourse to the traditional study of the Uni-
versal Movement is not per se ipsa but rather so as to demonstrate that the very 
rationality of this movement encloses certain metaphysical tenets that guide 
us to the Original Divine Attribution of such motion. God is the author of all 
being. The Principle of the Metaphysical Act, for example, is fundamental 
 1 The science of Metaphysics is the most stable rational science. Unlike Mathematics and to 
an even greater extent, Physics, Metaphysics is not subject to frequent modification. The 
metaphysical progress is therefore generally characterised by a vertical advance (constant and 
more profound distinction of perennial terminologies) rather than a horizontal one (acquisition 
of more information). Only a higher knowledge can impel Metaphysics to re-think its proposals. 
This complementary science is the Revealed Truth from which, for example, the notion of the 
Creation ex nihilo originates.
 2 Cfr. Życiński, J., «Metaphysics and Epistemology in Stephen Hawking’s Theory of the Creation 
of the Universe», Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science, 31/2 (1996) 275.
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so as to explain the fact that the Universe owes its origin to God the Creator 
precisely through action 3.
Aristotle, at least in what is traditionally attributed to his metaphysical 
deliberation 4, sustains the thesis that the Universe exists eternally. This eter-
nity is an ontological one because the Universe is in perpetual motion and the 
Prime Mover sustains this movement. The Prime Mover, however does not 
account for the origin of the existence of the Universe. Nonetheless, the so 
called Aristotelian Theology (the science of the First Mover) is neither incom-
patible with the already developed Theory of the Heavenly Beings nor is it 
contrary to the Theology of the Transcendent Being. The thesis of the Prime 
Mover is founded upon the fact of the Universal Movement that is our daily 
experience. «[The Aristotle thesis of the Prime Mover] aims at explaining that 
movement exists and must exist eternally (this is a condition of the eternity of 
time which is a characteristic of movement)» 5.
The eternity of the Universe according to Aristotle is not only that of 
its being (ontological eternity) but also that of its chronology. The Universe is 
atemporal because it is in constant and perpetual –timeless– movement. Time, 
as we know, is simply the measure of this movement 6. Therefore if the move-
ment of the Universe is eternal, so is time, its measure.
One of the first challenges that face Aquinas’ Metaphysics of Creation, 
in our view, is the question of the ontological and chronological eternity of 
the Universe. Another concern, albeit closely associated with the thesis of an 
eternal Universe, that calls the attention of any thinker is the centrality of 
the Natural Action postulate: Ex nihilo, nihil fit in the Aristotle Physics and 
Metaphysics 7. This postulate, in Aristotle, firmly establishes that the process 
by which real beings arrive at existence and perish is one exclusively character-
 3 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 1 co.
 4 Regarding the current debate about the authenticity of the works attributed to Aristotle see 
berti, E., Struttura e significato della Metafisica di Aristotele, Edizioni Universitá della Santa 
Croce, Roma 2006; aubenque, P., El problema del ser en Aristóteles, Escolar y Mayo Editores 
S.L., Madrid 2008.
 5 aubenque, 2008, p. 300.
 6 Cfr. ariStotLe, Physics, Iv, 11, 219 b1: «Hence time is not movement, but only movement in so 
far as it admits of enumeration... Just as motion is a perpetual succession, so also is time» (The 
revised Oxford translation of The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. I and II, edited by Jonathan 
Barnes, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1984) All direct citations of Aristotle will 
henceforth come from the same source.
 7 Cfr. Physics, I, 4, 187a28.
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ised by the Generation and Corruption. In this respect, the Principles of the 
Primary Contraries govern the speculation regarding the cause of the Change 
and Motion in the Eternal Universe 8. This is the second challenge brought 
out in our study.
However, as we shall see in the First Chapter of this Dissertation, the Prin-
ciple of the Primary Contraries becomes a positive affirmation that supports 
the fact that ex nihilo in the Divine Creation cannot be interpreted as «nothing-
ness». Put in other words, the Aristotle maxim, ex nihilo, nihil fit actually concurs 
with the fact that being must originate from the Being. The latter fact is the truth 
held by the Notion of the Divine Creation (creatio ex nihilo).
Omne agens agit sibi simile also called the Law of Similitude is a postulate 
that is crucial in the Aquinas Metaphysics of Creation 9. St. Thomas makes fre-
quent recourse to this metaphysical postulate in his Creation Thesis. In fact, 
the Law of Similitude becomes one of the principal bridging maxims of the 
Aristotle Theory of the Universal Movement and the fact that the substantial 
being of the Universal Reality is produced by God through the Divine Cre-
ation. The underlying principle that sanctions the valid analogical induction 
of any knowledge of God from the Natural Universe is founded on the fact 
that God is the First Efficient Cause of the Universe and that the effect, in some 
way, bespeaks its cause which is the colloquial wording of the metaphysical Law 
of Similitude.
The metaphysical Principle of the Natural Action: Omne agens agit se-
cundum quod in actu founds any possible description of the nature of God as 
an Active Agent. The real beings act because they are fundamentally in act; 
the act of being (esse). The above mentioned Principle is therefore decisive 
so as to explain the fact that the creatures, prior to their movement, are 
constituted in act through the Divine Creation. The Universal Movement, 
observable to us, actually pre-supposes, the metaphysical Divine Creative 
Action. The Supreme Perfection and Act is the Act of Being. It is the foun-
dation of all other pure perfections. It is in its very existence that the First 
Cause acts or causes goodness in other realities. As such to say that an agent 
acts insofar as it is in act really means that an agent acts insofar as it has the 
act of being. Existence is the foundation of the Universal Causal Action. 
 8 Cfr. Physics, I, 4, 188a19.
 9 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 1 co.
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The Principle of the Natural Action establishes the act of existence as the 
fundamental causal act 10.
The Second Chapter of the Doctorate Dissertation takes up a question 
again very closely related to the thesis of the eternity of the Universe. This is 
the enquiry into whether the World is a necessary or contingent reality. Here, 
Aquinas comes out as a novel thinker because he affirms that the Universe has 
been created freely and intelligently by God 11. Indeed this Thesis is so original 
that its nucleus is incorporated into the First Principles of the Metaphysics 
of the Divine Creation. Through the Principle of the Free and Intelligent 
Creation, Aquinas not only marks a breakthrough but also a break off with the 
Aristotelian Tradition which did not arrive at such conception as Personhood 
and Freedom of God, the First Cause.
For Aristotle, the Universe cannot but be necessary, both ontologically as 
well as temporally as we have seen above. Aquinas, on the other hand, guided 
by the Christian Doctrinal Truth is adamant that the World has a real begin-
ning. Moreover, this commencement of the Universe is by the Free Choice 
of God. Avicenna sustains the Thesis of the Necessary Divine Creation. The 
latter manifests strong roots in Aristotle. According to the Law of Singular-
ity which grounds the position of Avicenna, each one and simple cause can only 
produce a unique effect. A single cause cannot produce multiple effects. In the 
discourse of the Universal Creation, God is simply a natural efficient cause. 
The Divine Creation is interpreted at the hands of efficient causality because 
it is either the causality of the form of an entity or the composition of matter 
and form in existence. The unique effect of the efficient causal power of God 
is the First Intelligence.
In order to further appreciate the originality of the Aquinas philosophi-
cal position, it is necessary, as we shall see in the Second Chapter, to analyse 
the Platonic and the Neo-platonic metaphysical heritage that Aquinas demon-
strates. The axiom Bonum diffusivum sui affirms that the perfection of Goodness 
naturally diffuses itself. Given that God is identical to the Divine Goodness 
means that the Universal Creation is the natural propagation of the Transcen-
dental Good. This led the Neo-Platonists to the conclusion that God is not free 
to create or not to. He does so in a natural and spontaneous (diffusive) way.
10 Q.D.P., q. 2 a. 1 co.
11 Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 15.
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In this Chapter we shall see how Aquinas, in the various sources in which 
he seeks out the Neo-platonic axiom, presents us different manners of inter-
preting his thought; at times according to a natural necessary propagation and 
at other times as free and intelligent creation. A fundamental problem that 
one has to juggle with when analysing of the writings of the Angelic Doctor is 
this: If the Divine Goodness is identical to the Divine Essence (God Himself) 
means that the object of the Divine Will is this Essence 12. It therefore seems 
that the Bonum diffusivum sui is everything but the exteriorisation of the Di-
vine Self. Quite the contrary, it is an entirely immanent state of being. How 
then can we speculate about the production of the Universe, eternal nature to 
God, using this axiom?
Of definitive importance is the distinction that Aquinas makes between 
the perfections of being and goodness. It is true that the will is direct to the 
good. God wills the Ultimate Good, but this is not incompatible with the fact 
that he wills other good as is the creature. However to will the goodness that 
is the creature already pre-supposes the existence of such. The existence of the 
Universe is thus subject to the Absolute Creative Freedom of God. «God in 
willing His own goodness wills things other than Himself to be in so far as they 
participate in His goodness» 13: The distinction that God wills the creatures in 
so far as they exist becomes decisive. Here Aquinas introduces an all-impor-
tant paradigm shift which is the ontological order. God only wills the Divine 
Goodness in a necessary and direct way. He wills the goodness of the created 
Universe not directly but in so far as its existence (of the created Universe) par-
ticipates in perfection of the good. However, the only way in which the created 
Universe participates in goodness is through its very existence and this is what 
is willed by God 14.
The Third Chapter deals with the Notion of Relation in the Divine Cre-
ation. What is creation in God its Agent and what is creation in the creature 
its effect? Is creation a substantial or an accidental attribute? Is the created 
being any reception of being by a receiving subject? These are some of the 
puzzling questions that are associated with the Notion of the Divine Creation 
in relation with its agent and effect. St. Thomas Aquinas argues that the Cre-
12 Cfr. S.c.G., lib. I cap. 73 n. 2; lib. I cap. 74 n. 1.
13 S.c.G., lib. I cap. 81 n. 4.
14 As such the maxim Bonum et ens convertuntur is still maintained.
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ation attribute is only real in the creatures. It is however simply a rationally or 
logically attributed to the Divine Agent who is free to create or not to create 
and as such is not in any way ontologically dependent upon the creature 15. 
That the Divine Creation is ex nihilo is the very foundation of the real relation 
of the creature to the Creator.
The critique of the idea of the Esse Commune in the Aquinas heritage 
from Platonism becomes a worthwhile undertaking. In the Classical Doctrine 
of Participation, the being of the creatures is not radically distinguished from 
the Being of God since the Participation is attributed to both the agent and 
the effect 16. In the radical real distinction between the Esse Divinum and the 
esse creatum is founded the idea of Createdness. Is then the Creatural Character 
attributable to all reality distinct from God? Aquinas affirms the positive. The 
Supreme Being according to Aristotle does not mean the most perfect in the 
scale or gradation of reality but rather an entirely different order of reality 17. 
The principal attributes that surround the question of Relation in the Divine 
Creation are: The novelty of being, the relation of the creature to the Creator 
and the permanent and stable dependence that is this relation.
In this Abstract we have put together the salient sections of each of the 
three chapters described above in order to give a complete perspective of the 
Dissertation.
15 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 3 co.
16 Cfr. Guerrero, J., La creación como asimilación a Dios, Eunsa, Pamplona 1996, p. 18; Q.D.P., q. 3 
a. 5 co.
17 Cfr. SeLner, S. c., The metaphysics of creation in Thomas Aquinas’ De potentia Dei, UMI 
Dissertation Services, Michigan 1998, p. 36.
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The Act of Being, Free will & Intelligence and Relation 
as the First Principles of Creation: A consideration 
of some Aquinas writings
the PrinciPLe oF the metaPhySicaL act
1. an anaLySiS oF the naturaL action maxim: Ex nihilo, nihil fit
I n the study of the Metaphysical Act as the fundamental base of all being, the very earliest thinkers depended heavily on the observable reality that makes up the Universe. In order to arrive at solid commencement into the 
speculation regarding the nature of act, the study of physical movement is 
indispensable. That is why the Greek philosophers, on their path towards Me-
taphysics, arrive at certain postulates in the Cosmological science that provide 
the necessary stepping stones between the two sciences.
The postulate: Out of nothing, nothing comes to be (ex nihilo, nihil fit) has its 
earliest formulation in Aristotle 1. Its discussion is found within the context of 
the problem of the correlation between the One-Multiple in the rationaliza-
tion of the original cause of the Universe. Ancient thinkers sustain that mul-
tiple universal reality has one common original explanation (indeed this is the 
essence of any philosophical reflection about the origin of the Universe –to 
explain the multiplicity of real beings with respect to their commonness–) 2. 
There is an ultimate unity of universal being. This is the explanation of the 
One. On the other hand, observable movement: the coming into being of such 
and such kind of thing is simply a change of quality, combination and separa-
tion of particular beings or things. Multiplicity in universal movement is thus 
explained.
 1 Cfr. Physics, I, 4, 187a28.
 2 See section 2 below.
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Two key ideas regarding ex nihilo, nihil fit become palpable in the first 
book of Physics:
a) The Rule of the Contraries v. abstract Nothingness
The First Principles that found the philosophical deliberation of the 
original cause of the Universe are the Primary Contrary Principles: the fact 
that the contraries come into being from each other 3. It remains established 
thereby that the process of change observable in the Material World is guided 
by laws of contrary attributes. Preliminarily, therefore, the idea of the Non-be-
ing is refuted as a possible causal factor of the Universe because the impossi-
bility of something arising from what is not (the non-being) is evident. Only 
one alternative remains consequently: things come into being out of existent 
things, i.e. out of things already present.
What underlies the above affirmation is that the rational explanation of 
the original cause of universal reality does not admit that particular beings 
arise from the Nothingness. Rather, all existence must be attributed to that 
which already exists: All such things are already present in one another and do 
not come into being but are constituents which are separated out. This affir-
mation becomes vital to the positive perception of the ex nihilo expression which 
actually negates the possibility of nothingness as an original source of anything 
existent 4. Not only is there a concord between the original discernment of the 
ex nihilo, nihil fit postulate and the Aquinas position of creatio ex nihilo, but to a 
certain extent there is an concurrence of view with the present-day cosmolog-
ical refutation of an ex nihilo postulate incorrectly understood as: «the cosmos 
is the product of arbitrary nothingness» 5.
 3 Cfr. Physics, I, 4, 188a19.
 4 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 1 ad 7. Here Aquinas offers a linguistic analysis (which he attributes to St. 
Anselm) of the expression: «something is said to come from nothing». The negation intrinsic in 
the word nothing can be understood in 2 senses: 1) not from something or 2) from not something. 
In case 1, there are 2 further possibilities: the negation can include the verb ‘to come’ (1a) or 
no (1b). In (1a) something is said not to come from nothing which means that it does not come to be. 
This is the same conclusion as that of the postulate ex nihilo, nihil fit and as Aquinas illustrates: 
«In this way we say of a silent person that he speaks of nothing» or that God comes to be from 
nothing. In (1b) the negation only affects the preposition and in this sense something is said to 
come from nothing if it lacks any pre-existing substratum. In conclusion, that something comes to 
be from nothing can be interpreted either as ex nihilo, nihil fit or creatio ex nihilo.
 5 See Życiński, J., «Metaphysics and Epistemology in Stephen Hawking’s Theory of the Creation 
of the Universe», Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science, 31/2 (1996) 275: «Though I do not share 
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b)  The Eternity of the Substance: the Nothingness is accidental (qua), 
not substantial
Aristotle explains that the problem of the One-Multiple of the universal 
consideration of reality is resolved by the fact that there are only 2 principles 
that explain the original cause of the Universe: the Substance (One) and the 
dual Primary Contrary Principles (Multiplicity). The existent reality cannot un-
conditionally be said to come from nothingness because the Substance eternally 
exists (in the citation above ‘the doctor’ illustrates the Substance which is always 
present and is in fact the substratum of the universal action). As a consequence, 
the Non-being or nothingness cannot be an absolute value. It is considered in a 
qualified sense, that is, accidentally, or as the relative privation of the Substance.
In the ex nihilo, nihil fit postulate therefore, nothingness is understood not 
in an absolute sense but rather as an accidental privation that the Substance 
temporally experiences. What is nothing is actually something different from 
what is desired. For this reason, nothing is really a privation or qua what is 
not. «Our explanation on the other hand is that for something to come to be 
from what is or from what is not, or what is not or what is to do something or 
have something done to it or become some particular thing, are in one way no 
different from a doctor doing something or having something done to him, or 
being or become something from being doctor» 6.
In Aristotle, therefore, movement is essentially characterised by the reg-
ular transformation of the Eternal Substance through contrary principles.
c)  The Limitation of the Notion of the Natural Causality w.r.t. the Divine 
Creation: Ex nihilo, nihil fit
The difficulty of properly comprehending the power of God in the Di-
vine Creation according to the classical view of the Natural Causality is most 
explicit in the First article of the third question of Q.D.P. The latter view not 
the terminological preferences of Gruenbaum, I do agree that in none of the models of creation 
proposed by Hawking can we find a counterpart of the metaphysically conceived creatio ex nihilo. 
This objection does not stem from epistemological differences between metaphysics and quantum 
cosmology. Such differences would be obvious and natural. The basic problem remains, however, 
that in none of Hawking’s models is the very notion of nothing (nihilum) accepted in the sense in 
which it was classically understood in a metaphysical description of creatio ex nihilo. When nothing 
denotes something, the so called creation, in a physical sense of this term, can denote anything».
 6 Physics, I, 8, 191a35.
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only presents a difficulty in the conception of how God acts but becomes an 
almost unsurpassable hurdle when it comes to describe the fact that Divine 
Creation has occurred in the absence of any pre-existing substratum, ex nihilo.
The axiom from nothing, nothing comes to be (in Latin, ex nihilo, nihil fit) is 
taken to mean that every new substance is generated from certain pre-existing 
constituent elements. A statue becomes a reality according to its underlying 
components. The most basic is its material, say bronze, from which the sculp-
tor carves out the image or idea that he possesses. This idea is what is known 
as the form and constitutes the formal cause. The action of carving out the 
statute from raw bronze is the efficient causality of the statue. As such the final 
bronze statue is said to come from original bronze material that has suffered a 
transformation by the sculptor.
The material, formal, efficient and final causes are the distinct aspects 
of the Natural Causality 7. In the deliberation of the Divine Creation by St. 
Thomas Aquinas, these aspects are not altogether absent. According to Te 
velde, the production of the created being is somewhat analogous to the efficient 
cause, while the distinction of the multiple forms among creatures likens the 
formal causality and the permanent conservation or government of the Universal 
Creation by God is what Aristotle understands as the Final Causality 8.
Nonetheless, the ultimate maxim that governs the natural causes in the 
material universe is that from nothing, nothing comes to be 9. It is a principle 
of Physics and Natural Philosophy. It is a principle founded upon the observa-
tion of the Material Universe. It however has less influence when it comes to 
the science of Metaphysics which is our present concern.
Therefore the preliminary inquiry into the Universal Causality must 
unambiguously affirm that ex nihilo, nihil fit is not a first principle of Meta-
physics of Divine Creation. According to the said postulate, it is impossible 
to comprehend that the substantial being can come from nothing. The Cre-
ation of God, on the other hand, does not transform anything pre-existing 
but rather creates from scratch. Towards this quest, Aquinas in Summa contra 
Gentiles makes a notable distinction between the Philosophy of Nature and 
 7 See ariStotLe, Metaphysics, I, 8, 988b25.
 8 Cfr. te veLde, R., Aquinas on God: The ‘Divine Science’ of the Summa Theologiæ, Ashgate, 
Aldershot 2006, pp. 123-125: The three fundamental pillars of Divine Creation are producere in 
esse, distinctio and conservatio et gubernatio.
 9 Cfr. Physics, I, 4, 187a29, 33-34
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Metaphysics. The former pertains to the nature of the created universal while 
the latter is a much profound outlook and cannot omit the scientific inquiry 
into the Divine Creation because «the origin of the entire being from one first 
being cannot be understood as the transformation of being into another» 10.
The fundamental reason why the notion of being cannot solely be con-
sidered within the precincts of the Physical Universe is because being is the 
ultimate explanation of the universal reality. It is that which explains the re-
ality of both the physical and immaterial. As we shall see further ahead, given 
that the notion of being lacks any material foundation, it is best understood as 
an act. It is the act of being. This act gives the perfection to all reality.
Our deliberation on the Metaphysics of Divine Creation therefore has a 
considerable recourse to the notion of the Act of Being. Furthermore, the said 
Metaphysics elevates the notion of causality to the Transcendental Causality 
so that it can be adequately applied to the Divine Action which results in an 
extrinsic reality in the absence of previous substratum, ex nihilo.
d) The Non-being with respect to the Universal Creation
Inherent to the conception of the Divine Creation within the context 
of natural causality is the misunderstanding of the idea of the Non-being. 
The latter concept is taken for an existent subject. This misapprehension 
is unambiguous in the objections of the First article of the third question 
of Q.D.P. 11. Aquinas is categorical that the Non-being is simply an entity of 
the imagination. It does not have any real existence 12. It is not any material 
subject but the absolute absence of a passive material, substance or subject. 
Millán-Puelles elaborates the fact that understanding and being (existence) 
are identical in the sense that it is only possible to understand that being 
10 S.c.G., lib. II cap. 37 n. 2 (Et hanc quidem factionem non attigerunt primi Naturales, quorum erat 
communis sententia ‘ex nihilo nihil fieri’. Vel, si qui eam attigerunt, non proprie nomen ‘factionis’ ei 
competere consideraverunt, cum nomen ‘factionis’ motum vel mutationem importet, in hac autem totius 
entis origine ab uno primo ente intelligi non potest transmutatio unius entis in aliud, ut ostensum est (c. 
17). Propter quod nec ad Naturalem Philosophum pertinet huiusmodi rerum originem considerare: sed 
ad Philosophum Primum, qui considerat ens commune et quae sunt separata a motu)
11 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 1 obj. 10: «That which is made from nothing has being after non-being. 
Therefore we can consider an instant which is the last of its non-being, from which point it 
ceases not being, and an instant which is the first of its being, from which point it begins to be. 
These are either, one and the same instant or distinct instants...».
12 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 1 ad 10.
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which is possible. Put in other words, it is impossible to understand that 
which cannot possibly exist 13.
Contemporary thought has developed the notion of the so-called beings 
of reason (entia rationis). These, as opposed to the real beings, are those that 
not only lack the act of existence (or act of being) but are also deficient of any 
possibility of possessing it 14. They are existential impossibilities. An oppor-
tune question: How then can these existentially impossible beings be present 
in the Reason while, as we have seen above, the intellect cannot understand 
that which cannot possibly exist? The beings of reason are really intelligible 
because though, they lack the objective value in an absolute way; they never-
theless possess an intellectual objectivity 15.
Aquinas explains the Non-being in the S.Th. as follows: «If one considers 
the emanation of universal being with respect to its first principle, it is impos-
sible to presuppose any being to this emanation. Now then, non-being is the 
same as negation of all being» 16.
In the new maxim that explains the Divine Creation, ‘creation from noth-
ing’, the preposition ‘from’ does not have a causal connotation 17. It does not 
mean that Nothingness is the subject from which God produces created being. 
Furthermore, there is a distinction of order between being and the Non-be-
ing. It is the difference between the existential and non-existential order 18. 
This distinction is radical in the sense that there cannot be any passage from 
one order to another except by the action of a unique subject, an omnipotent 
agent who is God.
13 Cfr. miLLán-PueLLeS, A., Teoría del objeto puro, Rialp, Madrid 1990, p. 179.
14 Cfr. miLLán-PueLLeS, 1990, p. 454.
15 Cfr. miLLán-PueLLeS, 1990, p. 454. The author explains that ‘intelligibility’ here is understood 
as the form of the objects of the intellection rather than their content or the matter.
16 Cfr. aquinaS, t., S.Th., Ia q. 45 a. 1 co. (Unde, si consideretur emanatio totius entis universalis a 
primo principio, impossibile est quod aliquod ens præsupponatur huic emanationi. Idem autem est nihil 
quod nullum ens... ita creatio, quae est emanatio totius esse, est ex non ente quod est nihil)
17 The non-causal connotation of the preposition in ‘from nothing’ is well explained here. 
‘Nothing’ cannot be a material or efficient cause (Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 1 obj. 7). Nevertheless the same 
objection perceives the order from non-being to being as certain analogy or hierarchy which 
would imply certain likeness and dissimilarity between Being and the Non-being (Boethius). 
This view is refuted by Aquinas (and Avicenna earlier) who insists that there is not any order of 
definite proportion or real relation between being and non-being (See Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 1 ad 7). 
There is only an order of existential rational speculation between the two.
18 The Non-being is the absolute lack of the act of existence. It is an abstract concept that facilitates 
the explanation of the notion of Divine Creation (creatio ex nihilo).
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Aquinas presents a new outlook here. He provides a linguistic interpre-
tation of the creation from nothing in which he demonstrates that the preposi-
tion cannot have any causal meaning in the expression. To create from nothing 
means either to create not from anything which negates the existence of a sub-
stratum at the Divine Creation; or not to create from anything which negates the 
Divine Creation if this entails a pre-existent subject «... for non-being can in 
no way be the cause of being» 19.
The apparent procession of being from non-being is an inaccuracy of 
what in reality is. This error is resolved when non-being is considered to sim-
ply have a natural and temporal precedence to created being 20. Indeed the 
term ex nihilo means that creative action of God encounters a natural absolute 
lack of existence a part from Himself.
2. the PrinciPaL theSeS oF the aquinaS metaPhySicS oF creation
When one studies the Aquinas description of the expression creatio ex 
nihilo in the commentary of Q.D.P. 3 a. 1, it is important to highlight the 
approach he takes. He does not approach the justification of this expression 
from a so-called bottom-up inductive argument but rather from top-down 
deduction. Creatio ex nihilo is principally the metaphysical description, not of 
the nature of the nothingess as if this were the base of action, but rather of the 
nature of acting of the Being which is the Pure Act, God Himself. Aquinas 
describes God as the subject of the creative act rather than nihilum as a sort 
of object that is the departing point of the action of God. Hence he says: «On 
the other hand, God is all act, both in comparison to himself, since he is pure act 
without any admixture of potency, and in comparison to things which are in 
act, since in him is found the perfection of every being as the most complete 
and first source of those beings. Thus, through his action he produces the 
19 Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 1 ad 7.
20 According to Kretzmann, the notion of the Non-being can be understood as anterior to 
(created) being with a natural and temporal precedence. The Being is the very first positive 
act. The Non-being is therefore naturally prior to it because creatures can be said not to derive 
from but to follow non-being in a certain sense because they are brought to being by God. The 
Divine being, on the other hand, does not have anything that is naturally anterior to it. God 
is the First and Pure Act (See Kretzmann, N., The Metaphysics of Creation: Aquinas’s Natural 
Theology in Summa contra gentiles II, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999, p. 75).
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whole subsistent being, without anything pre-existing, since he is principle of 
all beings and acts according to his whole being. And because of this he is able 
to make something from nothing and this action of his is called creation» 21. It 
therefore becomes crucial for us to analyse the Notion of Action so to appre-
ciate the Principle of Act as a First Principle in the metaphysics of the Divine 
Creation.
The key to a proper interpretation of the idiom creatio ex nihilo lies in the 
rationale of the nature of the Divine Action. Only when the latter is appreciated 
(within the limits of human intellection) can we understand that: «God creates 
from nothing and not that nothingness is the origin of universal being». The 
distinction is minute but decisive. As Aquinas attests, the reason why God cre-
ates from nothing is that the nature of His action is that of a subject which the 
Pure Act is: «And because of this he is able to make something from nothing».
Aquinas’ commentary of article 1 cited above shall therefore guide our 
study of the Principle of Act as a First Principle of the Metaphysics of Divine 
Creation.
The third question of the Q.D.P. outlines the fundamental tenets of this 
question 22:
– The truth that God brings the universality of creatures into being in 
the absence of any pre-existing basis (ex nihilo) is the rationale behind 
the Divine Creation;
– Ex nihilo production of being is absolute and is what is called creation. 
This is the description of Creation;
– The Divine Creation is solely attributable to God;
– This is explained by the fact that Divine Creation is the universal jus-
tification of the being of all reality distinct from God;
– This is because only God can act in the most universal way that char-
acterises the nature of the Divine Creation;
– Aquinas argues that the action of natural agents is restrained in par-
ticularity by the fact that these are composed of an act and a limiting 
potency (matter in material realities) which makes them per se ipsa par-
ticular beings: «... no natural thing includes the acts and perfections of 
everything which is in act, but each has act confined to one genus and 
21 Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 1 co.
22 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 1 co.
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one species... And so the action of a natural agent does not produce be-
ing absolutely, but determines pre-existing being to this or to that» 23. 
God is the Pure Act «since in him is found the perfection of every 
being as the most complete and first source of particular beings» 24; 
«Thus, through his action he produces the whole subsistent being, 
without anything pre-existing, since he is the principle of all beings 
and (acts) according to his whole being» 25.
– The Divine Creative Action is causation of being. God is the first uni-
versal cause and foundation of all secondary causality.
Aquinas’ Metaphysics of Creation is greatly guided by two chief principles: 
a) Every agent acts in so far as it is in act 26; b) An agent produces its resemblance 27.
a) The Law of Similitude: Omne agens agit sibi simile 28
Aquinas seeks recourse to the Law of Similitude (or Similarity) when he 
‘endeavours’ 29 to describe the nature of act in God in analogy to the nature 
of physical, observable movement or action. The underlying principle that 
23 Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 1 co.
24 Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 1 co.
25 Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 1 co.
26 The capacity to act of God is the Pure Act of Being.
27 The effect of the creative action of God is the universal community of being because God 
produces the semblance of Himself which is being.
28 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 1 co.
29 The nature of God is incomprehensible to the human intellect due to the fact that God is the 
Infinite being while man is a finite creature. Consequently it is impossible to know God in a 
quiddative way (conceptually).The later is the natural way by which man knows i.e. through 
the essences of things (S.c.G., lib. I cap. 25 n. 5 & 10). Nevertheless, the philosophical science 
can extrapolate its knowledge of the being of the Universal reality so as to affirm that God is; 
that He exists: «Deus autem est Ipsum Esse» (S.c.G., lib. I cap. 25 n. 10); «Hoc nomen, Qui est, 
est maxime proprium nomen Dei» (S.Th., Ia q. 13 a. 11 co.). This affirmation is fundamentally 
based on the fact that real being is; its original cause must therefore possess the act of being 
because an effect bespeaks its cause. Christian Divine Revelation further confirms this truth 
when God describes Himself as «I am Who I am» (Exodus 3:14); «Thomas responds that in 
this life, God can be known by us only by means of forms found in effects. But effects are of two 
kinds. Some are equal to the power of their cause. Through such an effect the power of its cause 
can be fully known. Another kind of effect falls short of the perfection of its cause. By knowing 
such an effect we cannot fully grasp the power of its agent and, consequently, neither can we 
know its essence. We can however know for sure that its cause exists. Because every created 
effect enjoys only the latter kind of relationship to god, by reasoning from effect to God, we can 
know of him only that He is (wiPPeL, j. F., The Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II, The 
Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 2007, pp. 155-156)».
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sanctions the valid analogical induction of any knowledge of God from the 
Universe is founded on the fact that God is the First Efficient Cause of the 
Universe and that the effect, in some way, bespeaks its cause which is the colloquial 
wording of the metaphysical Law of Similitude. The analogical predication of 
a certain perfection in a positive way (not simply knowledge of God through 
negation of what is creatural) in creatures and in God is only attributed to the 
fact that there is a similarity, similitude or likeness of this perfection between 
both creatures and God 30.
It is important to note, preliminarily, that the axiom omne agens agit 
agens sibi simile is a metaphysical explanation in se of universal action. For 
this reason, this Law governs the nature of universal action in a proper sense. 
Both God and creatures act naturally but separately according to the Law of 
Similarity. The Natural Trinitarian Generative Action which is natural action 
within the Divine Essence (as opposed to creative) is sibi simile 31.
Nevertheless, we are obliged to clarify what sibi simile strictly means. 
This clarification is made necessary by the two variant positions regarding the 
metaphysical implication of the maxim omne agens agit sibi simile in Wippel and 
Rosemann. Does the maxim merely justify the «philosophical predication of 
certain names of God» in a proper sense (Wippel) 32 or is it a fundamental met-
aphysical tenet of the nature of agent action, «a principle which ensures that 
even the greatest degree of difference or dissimilitude between diverse ele-
ments of the cosmos can never become an absolute otherness» (Rosemann) 33?
According to Wippel, the Law of Similitude in Aquinas justifies the 
fact that our cognition of God though imperfect, can be real and positive 
because the names that designate pure perfections such as wisdom, goodness 
and being 34, are names that are attributed to God properly and not meta-
30 Cfr. wiPPeL, 2007, p. 154.
31 Cfr. aquinaS, t., In I Sent., d. 7 q. 1 a. 1: «God also acts according to these two ways (natural 
and rational powers). In effect, something proceeds from God in similarity to His Nature, 
receiving all the Divine Nature; not only essentially but numerically... For this reason, there is a 
generative power in God, in likeness to the Natural Productive Power».
32 Cfr. wiPPeL, 2007, p. 154.
33 Cfr. roSemann, P., Omne agens agit sibi simile, Leuven University Press, Leuven 1996, pp. 22-
23.
34 Cfr. S.c.G., lib. I cap. 30 n. 2: «Since it is posssible to find in God every perfection of creatures, 
but in another and more eminent way, whatever names unqualifiedly designate a perfection 
without defect are predicated of God and of other things: for example, goodness, wisom, being, 
and the like».
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phorically, through the similarity to their human connotation. The proper 
divine attribution of these names is explained by the fact that these pure 
perfections apply to God as res significata (real and positive) though not ac-
cording to the modus significandi 35 (imperfect) 36. In the quest to apply the 
Law of Similitude in the knowledge of God (albeit imperfectly), there is a 
prerequisite affirmation: that an effect is similar to its cause. The similarity 
of the effect to its agent cause is founded on the fact that through the Prin-
ciple of the Natural Action (everything acts insofar as it is in act), the agent 
infuses a form, analogical to self, in its effect 37. All agent causes (God and 
creatures) act in a similar manner.
Given that form found in the creatures is «like» but not «the same as» 
the Divine Form, the names attributed to God as pure perfections properly 
signify their «res siginificata» which is form (essence) per se ipsa, but imper-
fectly or deficiently apply to God with respect to the modus significandi because 
the form of the creature is analogical to the Divine Form.
For Aquinas therefore, «likeness» means «sharing the same kind of 
form» 38.
If we (validly) reformulate the ex nihilo, nihil fit postulate as follows: «From 
existence, existence proceeds», we see how the original explanation of universal 
movement plays testimony to the Law of Causal Similitude, «a principle which 
ensures that even the greatest degree of difference or dissimilitude between di-
verse elements of the cosmos can never become an absolute otherness» 39. The 
35 Cfr. S.c.G., lib. I cap. 30 n. 3: «I have said that some of the aforementioned names signify a 
perfection without defect. This is true with reference to that which the name was imposed to 
signify; for as to the mode of signification, every name is defective. For by means of a name we 
express things in the way in which the intellect concieves them... As a result, with reference to 
the mode of signification there is in every name that we use an imperfection, which does not 
befit God, even though the thing signified in some eminent way does befit God».
36 Cfr. wiPPeL, 2007, p. 155: «While there is no explicit citation of our principle here [omne 
agens agit sibi simile], it is implied in that Thomas rests the justification for predicating names 
of pure perfections of God on our recognition that, insofar as we find these perfections in 
creatures, they depend on God as their exemplar cause. In other words, they imitate him. If one 
has established this, one can reason in reverse fashion and apply such names to him in some 
non-metaphorical way».
37 Cfr. S.c.G., lib. I cap. 29 n. 2: «The form of an effect, therefore, is certainly found in some 
measure in a trascending cause, but according to another mode and another way».
38 Cfr. Kretzmann, N., The Metaphysics of Creation: Aquinas’s Natural Theology in Summa contra 
gentiles I, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1997, pp. 145-150.
39 Cfr. roSemann, 1996, pp. 22-23.
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Non-being or nothingness cannot be a real participant in the coming to existence 
of the Universe because it does not hold any existence whatsoever. It is the rad-
ical conceptual opposition to being.
b) The Law of the Act: Omne agens agit secundum quod in actu 40
An agent acts insofar as it is in act. The Universal Action is attributable to 
the possession of act, fundamentally understood as the act of being (esse 41). 
Consequently, the Principle of the Natural Action is based upon the fact that 
all agents, by their simple real existence, act according to their possession of 
esse 42. The Principle of the Natural Action precedes the Law of Similarity 
because in order to produce sibi simile, an agent must first be able to produce 
or to act and this is only possible if the agent is, that is, exists. This is our in-
terpretation of the sequential logic that the medieval thinker derives of the 
Law of Similarity from the Principle of Natural Action when he says: «since it 
belongs to the nature of action that an agent produces its like, since each thing 
acts according as it is in act» 43.
Nevertheless if the purpose of the Law of Similitude is exclusively to 
achieve certain knowledge of God based on our knowledge of the pure per-
fections (as Aquinas holds), then we encounter an apparent problem in the 
logical sequence of the Law of Similitude from the Principle of the Natural 
Action. This apparent dilemma has also been identified by Wippel 44. There 
40 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 1 co.
41 For example, we can compare the use of esse in: S.c.G., lib. II cap. 15 n. 6 (Unde, cum in infinitum 
procedi non possit, oportet quod sit aliquid necessarium quod sit causa omnium possibilium esse et non 
esse) –here employed as ‘the act of existing’– and S.c.G., lib. II cap. 15 n. 2 (Esse autem dicitur 
de omni eo quod est) –employed as ‘perfection’–. This absence of distinction between ‘being’ and 
‘existing’ when Aquinas uses the term esse is also attributable to the somewhat diverse translation 
of esse in different languages. Esse is the Latin indicative form of the verb ‘to be’. The present 
participle or gerund, ens (ens, entis), refers to ‘being’ while actus essendi is ‘the act of being’ as the 
most fundamental act or reality of any existence. St. Thomas Aquinas states that ‘being’ refers 
to the act of being as the most fundamental act and not to the manner of being. (Ens autem non 
dicit quidditatem, sed solum actum essendi, cum sit principium ipsum) (I Sent., d. 8 q. 4 a. 2 ad 2). In 
practice, esse is loosely used to mean ‘to be’, ‘being’, ‘the act of being’ and even ‘to exist’.
42 Cfr. wiPPeL, 2007, p. 166: «that each and every thing acts insofar as it is in act – Thomas 
seems to base this on the common sense view that if something is to produce something else in 
actuality, it must itself exist in actuality».
43 Cfr. S.c.G., lib. I cap. 29 n. 2.
44 Cfr. wiPPeL, 2007, pp. 166-169.
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is not any rational consequence in: the fact that «the perfections present in 
the effect are similar to those of its agent cause» from the fact that «an agent 
acts because it is in act». The two facts, it seems, are unrelated! However if 
we bear in mind that one of the pure perfections mentioned by Aquinas is 
precisely being (esse) 45, then we reach not only a logical but an ontological 
conformity of the maxims: The perfection of being or existence present in the effect 
is similar to that of its agent cause because an agent acts insofar as it is possesses the 
act of being or exists.
The Aquinas’ position that the Law of Similitude proceeds from the 
Principle of the Natural Action finds its foundation in the fact that the pos-
session of the act of being (esse or actus essendi) is the most fundamental expli-
cation of the pretext under which agents act, produce or cause; and the reason 
why their effect (another existence) is alike to them.
In the Proposition 20 of the Liber De Causis, we come across one of the 
initial articulations 46 of the Principle of the Natural Action: Omne agens agit 
secundum quod in actu. The proposition affirms: «The first cause rules all cre-
ated things without being mixed with them... And it rules all created things 
and infuses them with the power of life and goodness... The first goodness infuses 
all things with goodness only through one mode because it is goodness only through its 
existence, being and power, so that it is goodness, and both goodness and being 
are one thing» 47.
The Supreme Perfection and Act is the act that enables existence 48. It is 
the foundation of all other pure perfections. It is through existence that the 
first cause acts or causes goodness in other realities. As such to say that an 
agent acts insofar as it is in act really means that an agent acts insofar as it 
exists. Existence is the foundation of the Universal Causal Action. The Prin-
ciple of the Natural Action establishes the act of existence as the fundamental 
causal act. Indeed, «it is in the nature of every act to communicate itself as far 
as possible. Wherefore every agent acts forasmuch as it is in act: while to act 
is nothing else than to communicate as far as possible that whereby the agent 
45 Cfr. S.c.G., lib. I cap. 30 n. 2.
46 Footnote 14: aquinaS, t., On Creation, trans. Selner-Wright, S. C., The Catholic University of 
America Press, Washington D.C. 2011, p. 7.
47 Cfr. In De Causis, proposition 20 (Commentary of the Book of Causes, trans. Guagliardo, v., Hess, 
C., Taylor R., The Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C., 1996, p. 120).
48 Actus essendi or esse. 
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is in act» 49. The agent is primarily in act according to its existence. The agent 
therefore acts by communicating existence.
The commentary of Aquinas to the above Proposition provides further 
insight into the nature of the action of the first cause. He says: «But the first 
cause acts through its being, as was proved. Hence it does not act through any 
additional relation or disposition through which it would be adapted to and 
mix with things. And such a ‘relation’ is called here a connecting link or medi-
ating thing because through such a disposition or relation an agent is adapted 
to a recipient, and is a certain sense a mediating thing between the essence 
of the agent and the patient itself. So, because the first cause acts through its 
being, it must rule things in one manner, for it rules things according to the 
way it acts» 50.
Given that the act by which an agent exists is the fundamental propel-
ler of its action enables us to affirm that an agent acts in a singular manner 
because it acts insofar as it exists. This singularity of act further sustains the 
claim that the effect produced by an agent must reflect in some way the sin-
gular act by which the agent has produced it for the simple reason that the 
agent act is singular. And here lies the missing link between the Omne agens 
agit secundum quod in actu and the Omne agens agit sibi simile: The fact that the 
agent cause fundamental acts in a singular way, that is, according to existence 
means that its effect is a similitude of it by the mere fact that it exists! The very 
production or causation of an existent effect by an agent incorporates the two 
maxims (act and similarity) in one real action. Precisely in this explanation we 
find a bridge to the position of Rosemann that the Law of Causal Similitude 
is «a principle which ensures that even the greatest degree of difference or 
dissimilitude between diverse elements of the cosmos can never become an 
absolute otherness» 51. The perfection of existence is the necessary link be-
tween the Natural Agent Causality and its effects.
49 Q.D.P., q. 2 a. 1 co.
50 Cfr. In De Causis, proposition, 20 (Commentary of the Book of Causes, trans. Guagliardo, v., 
Hess, C., Taylor R., The Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C., 1996, pp. 
123-124).
51 Cfr. roSemann, 1996, pp. 22-23.
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the PrinciPLe oF the Free and inteLLiGent creation
1. Bonum diffusivum sui v. the Free and inteLLiGent creation 
oF the univerSe
In this Chapter, we focus on the study of the «how» the created reality 
proceeds from the Divine Author who is God. Aquinas affirms the fact that 
the Universe has been created freely and intelligently by God. This affirma-
tion, as we shall see, is closely associated with the Law of Similitude, Omne 
agens agit sibi simile. In the Fifteenth article of Q.D.P., question 3, Thomas 
Aquinas makes a reflection of whether the Universe was created necessarily, 
«by natural necessity», or out of the free choice of God, that is, «by the decree 
of his will» 52.
The argument presented by Aquinas brings with it a long philosophical 
tradition drawing back to Plato and especially the Neo-Platonism regarding 
the attribute of the Divine Goodness. The founding principle of the Neo-Pla-
tonic view of the Divine Goodness is Bonum diffusivum sui 53, that is, that good-
ness is self-diffusive. It is so understood in this philosophical tradition that 
the nature of the Transcendental Good is to naturally diffuse itself into other 
beings or realities. This natural diffusion forms the basis of the explanation 
of the Divine Creation as an act of emanation of God in other realities. Pla-
tonism holds as true the postulate that the existence of this Universe is the 
product of the necessity arising from the final causality of the Divine Good-
ness. The nature of the Transcendental Good is such that is self-diffusion (and 
hence efficient productive capacity) is necessary.
St. Augustine, and in this demonstrates his Neo-Platonist heritage, 
translates the philosophical axiom as the following: «Because God is good, we 
are» 54. The universal created reality ultimately proceeds from the Good, since 
52 Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 15.
53 The good is diffusive of itself is a Neo-Platonist philosophical axiom regarding the nature of good 
as perfection. See wiPPeL, 2007, pp. 218-223 regarding the Platonic and Neo-Platonist origins 
of this axiom.
54 auGuStine oF hiPPo, De Doctirna Christiana, I, 32: «But He does not use a thing as we do. For 
we refer the things that we use to the enjoyment of the goodness of God; but God refers His use 
of us to His own good. Because He is good, we are; and in so far as we are, we are good» (On 
Christian Doctrine, translated by D.W. Robertson Jr., The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis 
1958, p. 27).
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the Divine Goodness, natural and essential to God, is the cause that produces 
creatures, naturally and essentially as well 55.
Moreover, and here we see the influence of the Law of Similitude, given 
that the created reality, an effect of the Divine Action, is intrinsically good 56, 
it follows that its origin must be good because an agent acts in its likeness. 
This is how the Law of Similitude is sought to explain the Transcendental 
Goodness of God and the Created Universe in the Scholastic Metaphysics. 
Rosemann elaborates the fact that the Principle of Similitude in the Scho-
lastic Metaphysics is characterised by 3 aspects: pre-containment, influx and 
similarity. Causality is the metaphysical principle that ensures that there is a 
connection between the Universe and its Creator. The goodness of the creat-
ed being is therefore pre-contained in the Divine Goodness. Nevertheless, the 
Pre-Containment Maxim fundamentally affirms that the agent is the efficient 
cause of similar attribute in the effect because to ‘pre-contain’ means that the 
agent must have a capacity or power to produce the said effect 57.
This is how we arrive at the nucleus of the problem regarding the free 
and intelligent creation of the Universe by God. If the Good is naturally diffu-
sive of itself as sustained by the principle Bonum diffusivum sui and at the same 
time the intrinsic goodness of the created reality bears testimony to the Law 
of Similitude and its Pre-containment viewpoint which alludes to an efficient 
causality of the existence of the similarity in the effect, does it not follow that 
that the Divine Goodness in its natural self-diffusion, necessarily or naturally 
(as opposed to freely) produces the created effect? This is the central dilemma 
of article 15 and 16 of Q.D.P., question3.
According to the Aquinas Tradition, God is free to create the present Uni-
verse or any other that He so pleases. God has created the Universe out of his 
absolute freedom. God could have created the Universe or not. He freely chose 
to create it: «I answer that without any doubt we are to hold that God produced 
creatures in being by the free decree of his will with no natural necessity» 58.
Nevertheless Aquinas does not completely circumvent the necessary em-
anative implications of the axiom Bonum diffusivum sui. Take the thesis devel-
55 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 15 obj. 5.
56 This view not only is sustained by the Platonic Philosophical Tradition, but also is fundamental 
to the Christian Doctrine (see St. Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana, I, 32).
57 roSemann, 1996, p. 24
58 Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 15 co.
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oped in chapters 73 through to 75 of S.c.G. that God’s will is identical with 
His very essence 59 and this is the Divine Simplicity. The principal object of 
the Divine Will is the Divine Essence 60. The good that is understood is the 
object of the will 61. The primary object of God’s understanding is the Divine 
Essence. It therefore follows that the Divine Essence is the primary object of 
the Divine Will.
The consequential implication of this identification of the object of 
God’s will in the Divine Essence is made clear when Aquinas affirms that were 
God to will anything other than His Essence, then this other (an external ob-
ject) would be the cause of God’s volition 62. Now then since the Principle of 
Identity governs the Divine Being (Esse) and the Divine Will, there is not any 
external object from God that can provoke his volition towards it.
According to the thesis of the Perfect Identification of the Divine Essence 
and Will as developed by Aquinas in S.c.G., one could conclude that Aquinas 
philosophically sustains the fact that the Divine Will moves itself in a natural 
and necessary fashion towards the Divine Essence. This conclusion would of 
course not leave any room for the rational sustenance of the free-willing by 
God of an eternal reality to Him as is the case of the created Universe.
Moreover, Aquinas in chapter 75 of the cited work affirms that God, 
through his natural and necessary willing of self, also wills other things 63. Is 
this not a contradiction to God’s impossibility to will anything external to self 
as demonstrated above?
God is the Final Causality of the created Universe because only He can 
will the most ultimate end which is God Himself 64. But what does God natu-
rally will? He wills his own existence 65. In this way, Aquinas unites the concep-
tual distinction between the will and being into a unique ontological reality. 
By willing His own existence, God wills the existence of all that exists and this 
explains how the created Universe comes to be. In this manner therefore, God 
59 S.c.G., lib. I cap. 73 n. 2.
60 S.c.G., lib. I cap. 74 n. 1.
61 S.c.G., lib. I cap. 72 n. 2.
62 S.c.G., lib. I cap. 73 n. 3: «But the understanding of God is His being (cap. 45). For since the 
divine being is in itself most perfect, it admits of no superadded perfection».
63 S.c.G., lib. I cap. 75 n. 1.
64 S.c.G., lib. I cap. 75 n. 2: «God Himself is the ultimate end of things»
65 S.c.G., lib. I cap. 72 n. 2: «Hence, because he wills himself to be, He likewise wills other things 
which are ordered to him as to the end».
Crispus Kinuthia Kinyanjui
232 CUADERNOS DOCTORALES DE LA FACULTAD ECLESIáSTICA DE FILOSOFíA / vOL. 24 / 2014
can be said to will creation in willing himself. His will in the same way as the 
created Universe tend to the same object who is God. The universal created 
reality through the unique act of God’s willing therefore definitively tends 
towards God.
This Aquinas postulate could be interpreted as a thesis of the Necessary 
Divine Creation 66. For this reason Kretzmann criticizes this position of the 
medieval thinker which presents the Divine Will as purely determined to act 
in a certain fashion. God’s will is therefore not like the will of a person but 
rather «more like the earth’s naturally necessitated, utterly non-personal, stat-
ic appetite for remaining at the centre of the Aristotelian Cosmos» 67. Building 
up on the Aquinas affirmation that God in willing Himself also wills other 
things 68, Kretzmann comes to the conclusion that God must necessarily will 
the existence of the created Universe because the will of God is perfect which 
means that he lacks the deficiency of willing a certain end without will all oth-
er things directed to this end as is the created Universe.
On the other hand, he continues, it cannot be held that things external 
to God can be a means in order to attain, sustain or enhance the end who is 
God Himself. A further dilemma is the fact that in the general understanding 
of the human will, the things that are directed towards an end are considered 
as means. Applying the common understanding of the operation of the human 
will to God, it remains to be seen how things external to God could in any 
sense at all be willed by God as a means to the end 69.
Based on the Aquinas wording: «in willing Himself, God also wills other 
things» 70, Kretzmann argues that the created Universe occurs within the nec-
essary, choice-less divine willing. The single act of the divine will 71 therefore 
appears contradictory to a free-choice act. The Aquinas conception of God, 
66 See the Thesis of Avicenna below.
67 Kretzmann, 1997, p. 218.
68 S.c.G., lib. I cap. 75 n. 1.
69 Kretzmann, 1997, p. 219.
70 S.c.G., lib. I cap. 75 n. 1.
71 S.c.G., lib. I cap. 76 n. 2: «Every power is directed to its object and to the formal notion of the 
object by one operation or one act. For example, by the same sight we see light and colour, 
which becomes visible in act through light. Now, when we will something solely for the sake of 
the end, that which is desired for the sake of the end derives the nature of something willed from 
the end; and thus the end is to it as the formal notion of the object is to the object, for example, 
as light is to colour. Since, then, God wills other things for His own sake as for the sake of the 
end, as has been shown, he wills himself and other things by one act of will».
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goodness, creation and free-choice, Kretzmann insists, enfold an understand-
ing of necessity 72. Moreover, as we have seen, the Omnipotent Agent is not 
served of any means in order to reach its end. We cannot therefore attribute 
any sort of selection by the Divine Agent of how best to act. In the opera-
tion of the human will as we know it, selection is achieved only through free 
choice 73. Through free choice 74, the voluntary agent selects among the means 
known by the intellect and ordered according to utility 75 in order to achieve 
the desired end.
Kretzmann employs the following argument: We cannot apply this log-
ic to God because he is not motivated to act by any utility whatsoever. The 
question therefore remains pertinent: What motivates God to create anything 
at all? It is true, as Aquinas affirms that, the volition of other realities by God 
is founded on the fact that goodness is found in them and God wills all good 76.
He however fails to take note of the fact that Aquinas, in this point, af-
firms that God wills, not the goodness found in other realities but rather wills 
other realities to be 77. The goodness found in these realities pre-supposes their 
real existence and God gives this existence through the free and intelligent 
creation. The question as to why God would give real existence to these real-
ities (to create) consequently does not remain unanswered.
 S.c.G., lib. I cap. 76 n. 3: «Moreover, what is perfectly known and desired is known and desired 
according to its whole power. But the power of the end is measured not only according as it 
is desired in itself, but also according as other things become desirable for its sake. Hence, 
whoever desires an end perfectly desires it in both ways. But there is not act of will in God by 
which he wills Himself and does not do so perfectly, since there is nothing imperfect in Him. 
Therefore, by whatever act God wills Himself, he wills Himself absolutely and other things for 
His sake. But He does not will things other than Himself except in so far as he wills Himself. It 
remains, then, that God does not will himself and other things by different acts of will, but by 
one and the same act».
72 Kretzmann, 1997, p. 223. Kretzmann comes to the conclusion that the Aquinas position that 
God is free to create or no is heavily overwhelmed by his explanation singular way of acting of 
the Divine Will because God’s goodness which is the object and cause of God’s willing, is «also 
the very willing itself».
73 S.c.G., lib. I cap. 88 n. 2: «Free choice is said in relation to the things that one wills, not of 
necessity, but of his own accord».
74 Aquinas argues that God has free choice in so far as this, in the human intellectual operation, 
involves the inclination of the will to the judgment of reason as opposed to the pure natural 
instinct of sensible animals. (S.c.G., lib. I cap. 88 n. 3)
75 Kretzmann, 1997, p. 221.
76 Kretzmann, 1997, p. 222.
77 S.c.G., lib. I cap. 81 n. 4: «God in willing His own goodness wills things other than Himself to 
be in so far as they participate in His goodness».
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In conclusion, Aquinas sustains various theses that need to be placed side 
by side if one is to arrive at his overall perspective regarding the freedom of 
God to create:
– In the common understanding of the intellectual operations, the ob-
ject of the faculty of the will is the good;
– There is perfect identity between the Divine Essence or Goodness and 
the Divine Will. God wills Himself as the most ultimate good;
– The principal object of the Divine Will therefore is the Divine Es-
sence;
– God cannot will anything a part from Himself since this external real-
ity would become the object of the Divine Will and this is in contrary 
to the perfect simplicity due to the identity in God;
– God’s volition cannot therefore have any external cause;
– Given the perfect identification in God, the Divine Will moves in a 
natural and necessary way;
– Nevertheless Aquinas also affirms that God in willing himself, wills 
other things;
– Moreover Aquinas says that there is a singular act of the Divine Will;
Well then, in order to arrive at reconciling position in the Aquinas stand-
point, the argument of S.c.G., lib. I cap. 81 n. 4: «God in willing His own good-
ness wills things other than Himself to be in so far as they participate in His 
goodness» becomes decisive. Here Aquinas introduces an all-important para-
digm shift which is the ontological order. God only wills the Divine Goodness 
in a necessary and direct way. He wills the goodness of the created Universe not 
directly but in so far as its existence (of the created Universe) participates in per-
fection of the good. However, the only way in which the created Universe partic-
ipates in goodness is through its very existence and this is what is willed by God.
Our interpretation of the Aquinas position is as follows: the Divine 
Will moves through a single act which at the same time is the Pure and Ab-
solute Act 78. The Pure Act is universal by definition. For this very reason, 
78 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 1 co. Aquinas argues that the action of natural agents is restrained in 
particularity by the fact that these are composed of an act and a limiting potency (matter in 
material realities) which makes them per se ipsa particular beings: «... no natural thing includes 
the acts and perfections of everything which is in act, but each has act confined to one genus 
and one species... And so the action of a natural agent does not produce being absolutely, but 
determines pre-existing being to this or to that». God is Pure Act «since in him is found the 
perfection of every being as the most complete and first source of particular beings».
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it accounts for both the necessary and the contingent. In the single act of 
the Divine Will which is the Pure Act, therefore, God wills His being in a 
necessary manner, and contingently wills the existence of other beings in so 
far as they are good.
The contingency that attributable to the Pure Act can only be true if God 
is free and intelligent. God’s freedom therefore enables him to create or not 
the present Universe or whichever other that he freely desires.
It is our view, therefore, that Aquinas’ standpoint regarding the divine 
will is not deterministic at all. When Aquinas identifies the divine will to the 
divine being, he does so from the perspective of the final causality rather than 
the efficient causality. This is obvious from the fact that in the movement of his 
will towards his existence, ‘God does not produce God’. The intra-Trinitarian 
Existence is eternally persistent. The three Persons of the Trinity are not ef-
ficiently produced. They co-exist eternally. Therefore when Aquinas affirms 
such identity of the Divine Will to its being it is understood that the divine will 
is ‘intended’ for the divine being and vice versa.
Consequently, one cannot argue that the Divine Will is determined to 
produce the universal creation. On the other hand, it is true that the universal 
creation is ultimately ‘intended’ or destined to its author, the Divine Being.
Kretzmann is also of the view that only the production of the created 
being by the Divine Will can account for any «personifying choice anywhere 
in the divine volition» 79. Nevertheless, he errs in this affirmation. It is not the 
operation of the Divine Creation that gives God personal attributes. The in-
tra-Trinitarian Generation is precisely the specification of the Divine Persons 
in God. It is in this action that the Perfect Intelligence and Will of God is 
realised since the Trinity is the perfect comprehension of the Ultimate Truth 
and the Perfect Love or Will of this truth, God Himself.
The Intra-Trinitarian Being is a personified and dynamic relationship. 
It is the self-reflexive circularity of the substance and relations. Rosemann 
holds that the principle Omne agens agit sibi simile guarantees that the created 
Universe possesses a real revelatory quality of its Divine Agent Cause who is 
incomprehensible in se. «All the dynamism of creation, all its life, arises from 
the irreducible split which characterises it: a split whereby the principle and 
‘origin’ of the created being remains barred, hence becoming the object of an 
79 Kretzmann, 1997, p. 218.
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interminable quest» 80. Precisely the Trinitarian doctrine sustains that in God 
to be and to be in relation are one and the same thing 81. This is a breakaway from 
the tradition of the distinction between the substance and the relations in the 
Categories of Aristotle.
2. the doctrine oF the neceSSary divine creation in avicenna
Preliminarily, we state that the thought of the major Muslim philoso-
phers contemporaneous to the Scholastic period, namely: Ibn Rushd, Ibn Sĩnã 
and al-Farabi demonstrates strong Neo-Platonist traits. As a consequence, 
there is an underlying dualistic vein that interprets universal reality through 
the Essentialism and the Materialism. This dualism is founded upon the dis-
tinction of Plato between the real world of forms or essences and the degra-
dation of the same in the material universe. The Neo-Platonist vision of the 
absolute transcendence of God (a truth) is contrasted with the material nature 
of the universe (resulting in dualism). Henceforth, philosophical study strug-
gles to explain the creation of the physical cosmos and inevitably ends up in 
the introduction of the doctrine of the intermediary beings or intellects so as 
to explain the procession of material reality from immaterial God.
According to the Arab tradition, God is the Supreme Essence who pos-
sesses various attributes including intellect, will and causal power. The Islamic 
Theology differs in view of the relationship between essences and attributes 
from the Islamic Philosophy which maintains a distinction between the Di-
vine Essence and divine attributes. However there is a relationship of necessi-
ty between essence and attributes. The Islamic Theology advocates the com-
prehension of God as a unity of essence and attributes. This is done so as to 
80 roSemann, 1996, p. 342.
81 Cfr. roSemann, 1996, pp. 346-347: «The Christian doctrine of the Trinity teaches us that 
the split between substance and function is healed in esse as it is in itself. In God, the ‘other’ 
functions no longer as a principle of alienation, so that the mediation of the self through an 
‘other’ is in God, and in God alone, a process which does not involve any loss of self. Substance 
and function are no longer opposite, though co-constitutive, poles; rather, in God substance is 
function (or relation)»; also pp. 347-348: «The divine essence, which is thoroughly relational 
–indeed, which is nothing else than the three persons, who are their relationships–, still is in no 
way relative. At the summit of being, substance and relation (function) lose their contradictory 
character. This is the essence of St. Thomas’ teaching on the Trinity». Aquinas is of the view 
that the Divine Persons of the Trinity are the very subsistent relations (S.Th., Ia q. 40 a. 2 ad 1).
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preserve the fact of the Divine Unity and Simplicity. The Arab Philosophers 
–Ibn Rushd, Ibn Sĩnã and al-Farabi– interpret the Christian Teaching as pol-
ytheistic because this sustains the doctrine of the Trinitarian God while Islam 
contrarily maintains a radical oneness in God 82.
It is our view that a new approach to the notion of causality is well de-
sired in the Islamic philosophical deliberation, especially if one is to apply 
this notion to any worthwhile Metaphysics of the Divine Creation. Thanks 
to the Platonism and the thought of Aristotle certain important tenets have 
found stable dwelling in mainstream Philosophy. They are: the absolute tran-
scendence of God, the Principle of Causality and the notion of Participation. 
Nevertheless, in the study of the Metaphysics of Divine Creation, one comes 
to term with the impediments of the unqualified application of the said tenets. 
The study of the Principle of Causality in Arab tradition firmly maintains 
the naturalistic vision of Aristotle save for a slight distinction. The Muslim 
philosophers take up the thesis of the four causes of the Greek thinker and 
apply this thesis to the creation of the Universe. Nevertheless there is an at-
tempt to go beyond the Aristotelian notion of the First Mover which seeks to 
explain changes manifested in the processes of existence, the Generation and 
Corruption. These thinkers endeavour to present a more theological point of 
view regarding the question of existence. They therefore consider God the 
«Unique Originator» 83.
A simple naturalistic view of causality in God presents yet another hurdle, 
this time for Islamic theology. This is the question of dependence of creatures 
upon God, a postulate upheld by this theology. According to the principle of 
the Natural Causality, an agent produces an effect in a procedural manner, 
that is, the effect is produced in motion with a determined beginning and end. 
God therefore must be involved in a continuous re-creation of the Universe. 
How else would we explain the stable existence and constant change that char-
acterizes material universe?
Contrary to this ‘Theistic vision’ of creation, the Arab Philosophy, 
when considering the cause of the Universal Creation, does not distinguish 
between God and immaterial creatures. The latter are intermediaries in the 
82 Cfr. berti, E., Struttura e significato della Metafisica di Aristotele, Edizioni Universitá della Santa 
Croce, Roma 2006, p. 130.
83 This paradigm shift is motivated, above all, by the desire to be faithful to the writings of the 
Qur’an (God is the supreme author of all creation).
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creation of the world 84. Avicenna picks up the theory of the ten intelligent 
agents that participate in the creation of the universe as outlined by al-Fara-
bi so as to formulate his thesis that creation is limited to immaterial in-
tellects (the ‘givers of existence’) while physical bodies are the preparatory 
agents for new forms of objects and effects: Avicenna divided agents into 
two kinds: the Divine Agent who bestows existence; and natural agents that 
cause movement and change in bodies... However, al-Farabi and Avicenna 
also considered other immaterial beings to be creative causes along with 
God. So as to facilitate the application of the creative cause to immaterial 
creatures, Avicenna defines ‘cause’ as that which comes to existence by itself 
or by means of other causes and then becomes a source for the existence or 
continued existence of others 85.
The error of the reflection of Avicenna regarding the concept of causality 
can therefore be found at various fronts: 1) in the definition of causality in 
such a way that it applies to universal reality, that is, the application of cau-
sality to God as the Divine Agent who is causa sui, and 2) in the very concept 
itself which he claims imperceptible by the senses which only perceive simple 
sequence of events.
When Avicenna sets out to reflect upon the concept of the Divine Cre-
ation, he affirms that there are two existential causes: the agent and the pur-
pose. The agent is God as the creator of existence while the purpose is the 
finality of the Divine Action. The principal motivation of the action of God is 
his existential will. God creates in an arbitrary manner.
According to Avicenna, the Divine Creation is the necessary external 
causal action of God. Indeed the guiding principle of Avicenna is that at-
tributes are necessary consequences of the essence. The causal attribute in 
God is a necessary consequence of the Divine Essence. In the critique we 
hereby make of the thesis of Avicenna, one must make a distinction between 
necessity in the subject who is God and the object which is the creature. 
Avicenna, faithful to the doctrine of the Qur’an, admits the contingency 
of the cosmos or created universe. However it is the view of Arab thinkers 
that the laws of causality rule over every universal existence including the 
essence, attributes, and actions of God. Given that God must create, divine 
84 The pure forms or essences contribute to the creation of material universe (Neo-Platonism).
85 Cfr. yaSrebi, y., «A critique of causality in Islamic philosophy», Topoi, 26 (2007) 259.
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knowledge is founded on the awareness of effects 86. The Divine Knowledge 
is fundamentally that of the effect, that is, the recognition by God that he is 
creative cause.
«Of course the reason why, for Avicenna, whatever comes to exist is prece-
ded by matter is precisely because, for him, the existence of anything that 
comes to exist is preceded by the possibility of its existence, and, as has just 
been argued, there would be no possibility if there were no matter qua sub-
ject in which that possibility inheres. Consequently for Avicenna it is simply 
absurd to claim that God created matter, and so the world, at some first 
moment in time before which it did not exist. This is because if only what 
is possible can be created, and matter is supposed to be created after not 
existing, then the possibility of creating the matter must have existed prior 
to the matter; but again for Avicenna, this possibility requires the existence 
of matter as substrate in which it inheres» 87.
The erroneous thesis of the Divine Creation through intermediary in-
tellects must be comprehended within the scope of naturalistic causality in 
which the Arab Philosophy navigates. According to the Law of Singularity, 
each one and simple cause can only produce a unique effect. A single cause 
cannot produce multiple effects. In the discourse of the Universal Creation, 
God is simply an efficient cause. The Divine Creation is interpreted at the 
hands of efficient causality because it is either the causality of the form of an 
entity or the composition of matter and form in existence. The unique effect 
of the efficient causal power of God is the First Intelligence 88.
How then do the material beings come to existence? The Tenth Intel-
ligence (dator formarum) is the ‘provider of forms’ which are infused into the 
86 Cfr. yaSrebi, 2007, p. 262. Yasrebi attributes the subordination of God to causal laws in Islamic 
philosophy to the influence of Greek thought where all existence is subject to destiny. There is 
a subordination of Divine will to Divine knowledge.
87 mcGinniS, j., «The Ultimate Why Question: Avicenna on Why God is absolutely necessary», 
in The Ultimate Why Question: Why is there anything at all rather than nothing whatsoever?, John F. 
Wippel (ed.), The Catholic University of America, Washington D.C. 2011, pp. 81-82.
88 The Hypothesis of the Intelligences originates from Neo-Platonism. Philo of Alexandria affirms 
the absolute transcendence of God and consequently demonstrates the need for intermediary 
beings in the creation of the universe. These are the Logos and the Nous. God did not create the 
material world immediately. First he created the intelligible world (kósmon noetón) which is the 
universe of archetypes and intelligent ideas (noetén idéan). The material universe is a subsequent 
copy of the intelligible universe (See PhiLo oF aLexandria, De Opificio Mundi, Iv, 16).
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Prime Matter, pure potentiality. Given that matter is the principle of individu-
ation, the same form can be found in a plurality of individual concrete objects. 
Firstly, the Prime Matter is taken out of its state of in-determination through 
acquisition of its specific form (forma corporeitatis). The act of an external cause 
then predisposes this matter to acquire one particular form. Avicenna, in this 
thesis, is able to fuse the notion of God as the Unmoved Mover, who, accord-
ing to Aristotle is absolutely dissociated from the origin of the material world 
which subsists through the laws of causality 89, and the active agent of material 
universe which is the Tenth Intellect.
According to Avicenna, the Universal Creation is not simply explained 
off as the direct or immediate procession from the Divine Act. There must be 
a chain of events that result in the final material Universe 90. The Hylemor-
phic (matter and form) composition of material reality, a natural occurrence 
according to Aristotle, is based on the cohesive and repulsive forces that are 
existent in the composite entity. They ensure the stability of the material sub-
stance.
The comprehension by Avicenna of the fact of creatio ex nihilo is dubious 
given that he is convinced that an entity cannot exist without pre-existing 
matter and every contingent being needs the Prime Matter and time. Matter 
is therefore eternal and ‘creation from nothing’ is only a theoretical percep-
tion 91. The position of Avicenna is that the metaphysical creatio ex nihilo is 
made up of 3 stages: non-existence, existence and the fact of the passage from 
one to the other. The necessity of the causal power pertains to the existence 
of the created effect. All created effect necessarily must exist. There is not 
any ‘possibility of existence’ or passage from potentiality to actuality. As such, 
there is not any constant dependence of an effect upon its cause which acts in 
a certain distinctive moment. The philosophical pursuit of Avicenna arrives at 
89 Although Aristotle demonstrates the need for creation of the universe when he pursues the 
question of the origin of universal existence and movement, we cannot affirm that he may 
have comprehended the notion of «creatio ex nihilo» as the Christian era has. His view on the 
eternity of matter and the constant emphasis on the autonomous nature of causal laws in the 
universe leave little room for the truth of Divine Creation which is the production of universal 
created being in the absence of any substratum, distinction of the multiple forms or creature and 
the constant and indispensable governance (dependence) of creation by God.
90 Causality is one of the secondary intelligible that describes objects in the external world.
91 This is the constant danger of pushing Metaphysics to pure abstraction lacking any reference to 
the reality.
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the conviction that matter is infinite and eternal. Therefore so as to avoid a 
never-ending and consequently illogical regression of causes we must affirm 
that there is an efficient cause, the Necessary Existence, as the fountainhead 
of all other existence. God the Creator is the efficient cause.
The ‘doctrine of the intellects’ does not provide a satisfactory explana-
tion of how material beings can originate from immaterial ones especially if 
we are to maintain the sequence of causality and the Law of Singularity. «If we 
can thus consider Allah –with his infinite names and attributes– as the source 
of all phenomena and the cosmological order, why should we make Him de-
pend on intermediaries for the creation of this? Why do we taint the mono-
theistic cosmological order with the hue of polytheism?» 92 Moreover God is 
deprived of an active status with respect to creation. Islamic Philosophy lays 
undue emphasis of the role of the Divine Knowledge at creation (rooted in 
Greek deliberation 93) at the expense of the Divine Will.
The Principle of Causality cannot be an independent concrete reality 
to which the Universal reality, including God, is the object. Nevertheless, it 
is not a pure abstraction of the relationship between external events by the 
human mind. Common everyday experience or common wisdom tells us that 
‘Fire burns’ and not ‘I can perceive that when fire is put next to a piece of 
paper, this begins to burn’. We can truthfully conclude that it is the nature 
of fire to burn. If fire did not burn, it would not be fire! In fact, the Principle 
of Causality goes beyond mere observation and describes the very nature of a 
being. What is said of a subject as cause is said of the very nature of that sub-
ject. For this very reason, one must be very precise in the application of the 
Principle of Causality to God as the Divine Being. This is the big dilemma of 
Avicenna and the Islamic Philosophy. God cannot be the object of causality. 
He is the Uncaused Cause. For this very reason, the Principle of Causality 
originates from the perception of the created reality as an effect and not from 
the perception of the nature of God as cause.
Aquinas provides a more than worthwhile deliberative response.
92 Cfr. yaSrebi, 2007, p. 261.
93 The concept of the Nous initially derives from the Pluralist philosophy and especially from 
Anaxagoras. Socrates discovers it in his quest into possible non-cosmological explanations 
regarding the original cause of the universe. Through Socrates, the principle of the Nous (νούς) 
or the Mind as the cause of all natural law and order in the cosmos find its place in the History 
of Philosophy (See Metaphysics, I, 3, 984b15).
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3. arGument one: God iS the FinaL cauSe oF the created univerSe. 
GoodneSS iS PerFective not Productive
In the first argument that Aquinas employs to sustain his position, he af-
firms that the Universe must have some final causality or purpose since it did 
not come to being by chance, «there is an intended end in God’s production 
of creatures».
Aquinas makes a subtle introduction of the intrinsic relationship between 
the intellect and the will in an agent of intellectual nature as is God. The will 
or free action is contra-posed to natural or necessary action. Both the will and 
nature act towards an end but in distinct ways. The natural action takes place 
in a determined or ‘blind’ fashion. Aquinas says: «For since nature does not 
know its end or have any notion of an end for itself or the relation of means 
to an end, it cannot determine an end for itself or move or order or direct 
itself toward an end» 94. The natural action of an agent is pre-determined by 
a free agent who knows and wills the determined end of this natural agent. 
Aquinas demonstrates this thesis with the example of an archer and an arrow. 
The archer is the voluntary agent who knows what his target is and will to hit 
it. The arrow on the other hand is a natural agent whose movement is totally 
determined by the aim of the archer 95.
Aquinas demonstrates the intrinsic relationship between the intellect and 
the will in a different manner in S.c.G. Here he goes forth to assert that if God is 
intelligent, he must also have a will given the conceptual nature of the intellect 
and will. The good is the proper object of the will. Nevertheless this good must be 
understood as such in order for it to become an object of the will. This is because 
the will as a faculty in itself lack the power to perceive the good. It is the intellect 
that previously knows or understands what is good and consequently presents 
this to the will which is the appetite which moves towards this known good  96.
94 Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 15 co. 
95 Aquinas makes reference to Aristotle who comes to the conclusion that certain operations of 
vegetative and animal life such as the reproductive process demonstrate an intelligent design. 
Aristotle concludes that: «In all this nature acts like an intelligent workman» (Generation of 
animals, I, 731a24). The citation by Aquinas of this text, however, erroneously points not to 
the imitation of intelligence in the plant and animal kingdom but rather to the fact that the 
operations of plants and animals bespeak their intelligent cause.
96 S.c.G., lib. I cap. 72 n. 2: «From the fact that God is endowed with intellect it follows that 
he is endowed with will. For, since the understood good is the proper object of the will, the 
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A free or voluntary agent on the hand knows and understands the finality 
for which it acts. It acts for a certain purpose towards which it moves itself and 
this by ordering its actions to this set end.
The rational proof that God is intelligent is dutifully undertaken by 
Aquinas in S.c.G. Our objective here is simply to highlight how this thinker 
founds the Final Causality Argument of the created Universe on the fact that 
God acts intelligently and thus freely. In the sixth argument that demon-
strates the intelligence of God, Aquinas sustains that all created being that 
tends to a determined end which is either inherently placed in the self (nat-
urally) or by another (rationally). Now then, given that the natural beings 
do not know the rationale of their finality, they cannot determine their own 
finality. The latter must necessarily be set by another being. This one is the 
Creator of all nature. And hereby we have the clear demonstration that he 
who gives finality to created being is whom we call God. He would otherwise 
not be able, lacking intelligence, to order the finality of created being. God 
therefore is intelligent 97.
In order for Aquinas to tackle the problem of the Necessary Divine Cre-
ation that arises from the deliberation of the axiom Bonum diffusivum sui, he 
first notes that this axiom has a efficient-causality connotation. That the Good 
is diffusive of itself means the Good necessarily produces the good. However, 
as Wippel remarks, Aquinas is quick to show the broader meaning of the verb 
diffuse. This verb may refer to the fact of producing a reality in another, as for 
example a black drop of ink diffuses colour in a glass of water. But in may also 
refer to the fact of a reality becoming the finality of another, as for example 
understood good is, as such, willed. Now that which is understood is by reference to one who 
understands. Hence, he who grasps the good by his intellect is, as such, endowed with will. But 
God grasps the good by His intellect. For since the activity of His intellect is perfect, as appears 
from what has been said, he understands being together with the qualification of the good. He 
is, therefore, endowed with will»
97 S.c.G., lib. I cap. 44 n. 7: «Again, that which tends determinately to some end either has set 
itself that end or the end has been set for it by another. Otherwise, it would tend no more to this 
end than to that. Now, natural things tend to determinate ends. They do not fulfil their natural 
needs by chance, since they would not do so always or for the most part, but rarely, which is the 
domain of chance. Since, then, things do not set for themselves an end, because they have no 
notion of what an end it, the end must be set for them by another, who is the author of nature. 
He it is who gives being to all things and is through himself the necessary being. We call Him 
God, as is clear from what we have said. But God could not have set an end for nature unless he 
had understanding. God is, therefore, intelligent».
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wisdom diffuses itself to a keen mind. Therefore diffusion in Bonum diffusivum 
sui can be understood as final causality 98.
This is the breakthrough of St. Thomas Aquinas in order to sustain that 
God is free to create or not to. The nature of good is such that it perfects 
the will that which participates in it rather than produce it in being. For this 
reason we can say that the Transcendental Good is perfective rather than pro-
ductive 99.
Affronted with the thesis that the Good is naturally productive according 
to the axiom Bonum diffusivum sui, Aquinas makes another important distinc-
tion. This is the conceptual difference between the transcendental notions of 
being (ens) and good (bonum). Indeed by sustaining that the good produces good, 
the mentioned philosophical axiom cuts across two metaphysical conceptual 
planes, that of Goodness and that of Existence. It is true that the transcenden-
tal notions are inter-related in the sense that in reality these notions converge 
upon what exists where they are identical 100. Nevertheless, conceptually, while 
ens refers to the possession of the actuality, bonum is the object of the appetite 
of the will 101.
In the turn of events, Aquinas arrives at such affirmation that: Bonum 
diffusivum sui in bona re 102. That is: good is perfection that is said not of itself 
but of real things insofar as they possess it. Aquinas, guided by the Law of 
Similarity, understands that the created reality is said to be good because 
it is the effect of the Divine Causal Agent. According to the cause-effect 
 98 wiPPeL, 2007, p. 227: «Therefore whatever shares in the nature of an end shares in the nature 
of good... Thomas’ emphasis on the causality of the good as pertaining to the order of finality is 
crucial to his defence of God’s freedom to create».
 99 S.c.G., lib. I cap. 72 n. 3: «Everyone desires the perfection of that which is willed and loved by 
him for its sake». Good is this perfection while the will is the productive faculty that realizes this 
perfection. St. Thomas demonstrates the productive nature of the will when he says: «Hence, 
because he wills himself to be, He likewise wills other things which are ordered to him as to the 
end» (S.c.G., lib. I cap. 72 n. 2).
100 The being is both the truth and the good.
101 S.Th., Ia q. 5 a. 1 co. (Bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem: sed differunt secundum rationem tantum... 
Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit, quod aliquid sit appetibile... Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque 
est appetibile secundum quod est perfectum: nam omnia appetunt suam perfectionem. Intantum est autem 
perfectum unumquodque, inquantum est actu: unde manifestum est quod intantum est aliquid bonum, 
inquantum est ens: esse enim est actualitas omnis rei).
102 The perfection goodness is said to be diffusive in so far as this perfection is found in the created 
reality (good things). Goodness in itself therefore does not produce the created reality but is simply 
found in them or perfects them.
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relationship of the principle Omne agens agit sibi simile, there is a pre-contain-
ment, similarity and influx of the effect in the cause. The good must therefore 
pre-exist in God for it to be said of created being; the perfection present in 
an effect is a certain likeness of its agent because Ever agent produces some-
thing its likeness. Indeed it is the Law of Similitude that provides a guiding 
principle in order to affirm that good in itself does not produce as an effi-
cient causality but rather that an agent which possesses goodness transmits 
this perfection to its effect.
Now then given that goodness is not productive in itself but rather is per-
fection that is possessed by real beings, Aquinas can well conclude that God 
who is all-good is free to create the Universe or not. If and when He chooses 
to create the Universe, in this very act of creation, he infuses goodness in the 
created being.
4. arGument two: the naturaL trinitarian Generation 
and the Free creation
This tenet which Avicenna earlier uses so as to justify his position that 
the Divine Creation is both necessary and emanative 103 Aquinas now employs 
so as to construe the axiom Bonum diffusivum sui: That «nature is determined 
to one thing» is founded upon the principle Omne agens agit simile sibi 104. Ever 
agent produces its like and this is the determination that characterises the 
natural agent action.
In the Divine Being, it is essential to distinguish the natural action from 
the free action. Indeed the Avicenna tenet is applicable to God in so far we 
consider the Intra-Trinitarian Action. God the Father necessarily generates 
God the Son. The Trinitarian Generation plays testimony to the Law of Si-
militude in so far as this is understood as a sort of physical resemblance of 
which natural propagation is the best example.
Without a doubt, the Pre-containment maxim is not attributable to the 
Trinitarian God because God the Father does not pre-contain the Divine Fil-
iation but rather eternally and necessarily generates Him. Nonetheless, the 
103 GiLSon, 2002, p. 150.
104 Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 16 co.
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voluntary creative action of God also plays testimony to the Principle of Sim-
ilarity thanks to the said maxim. The fact that God creates in infinity and 
diversity that manifests His freedom as opposed to the Natural Trinitarian 
Propagation is also borne out by the principle Omne agens agit sibi simile. This 
is the basis of his third argument as seen below.
5. arGument three: the Pre-containment maxim 
in the omnE agEns agit siBi similE
It is the search for a more ample view of Omne agens agit sibi simile that 
draws Rosemann to ask: «In what way for example, could a cat be said to ‘re-
semble’ the vase that is has knocked to the ground?» The Law of Similarity 
not only governs the physical likeness between the agent and its effect but 
sustains too the pre-containment of the effect in the cause 105.
In this argument, Aquinas demonstrates the far-reaching implications of 
the Law of Similitude when he uses it to explain the fact that an effect some-
how pre-exists in its cause because every agent produces its like. The existence 
of perfection in an effect is in accordance with the nature of that effect. In 
this sense, perfection is said to be transcendental with respect to the effect 
which solely limits the manner in which this perfection is found in it but does 
not affect the nature in which the perfection exists in the causal agent of the 
effect. This, Aquinas explains with the thesis: «Now everything which is in 
something is in it according to the mode of that in which it is» 106. This thesis 
originates from an earlier one found in De Causis which affirms that «anything 
receives what is above it only through the mode according to which it can 
receive it, not according to the mode according to which the received thing 
[itself] is» 107.
How then does the created effect pre-exist in the Divine Agent? It is a 
foregone conclusion that God is intelligent. We have seen in the first argu-
ment how Aquinas draws an intimate connection between the will and the 
intellect in a free agent cause. Now the Pre-containment maxim of the Law of 
105 Cfr. roSemann, 1996, p. 23.
106 Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 15 co.
107 In De Causis, proposition 10.
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Similarity leads us to affirm that the created being must in some way be pres-
ent in the Divine Agent Cause. Aquinas explains that precisely because God is 
intelligent, the created nature is intelligibly pre-conceived in Him. Moreover, 
the relationship between the intellect and the will is such that what is willed 
must be known and what is known is what moves the will to act. Therefore, 
the intelligible pre-existing created reality in the Divine Intelligence is the 
motor of the voluntary creation of the Universe by God. The intimate inter-
play between the intellect and the will is what comprises the Free Intelligent 
mode of acting.
The doctrine of Pre-containment serves Aquinas in order to reason out 
that an agent which wills something in itself and for its own sake (as opposed 
to that which will for a certain external finality) wills and loves all those things 
in which this thing is found. Such is the case of God who wills his own being 
in and for itself: «Every other instance of being is a certain participation in the 
divine being by way of likeness» 108.
6. the divine creative act: Free, inteLLiGent and immanEnt?
As earlier explained, the Pre-containment maxim that affirms the pre-ex-
istence of the effect in the causal agent totally excludes the Intra-Trinitarian 
Action from the causal-effect relationship. This is not so however for that 
action by God that involves the intellect and the will. This is the case of the 
Transitive Creative Action. The latter is an action of the free and intelligent 
Divine Causal Agent. Aquinas’ Metaphysics of the Divine Creation is articu-
lated by the Createdness of the Universe which intrinsically implies the produc-
tion of things into being. In order to create, therefore, God who is the purely 
actual being must act as an efficient causality of the existence of the Universal 
Creation.
As such the axiom Bonum diffusivum sui cannot be the fundamental prin-
ciple that explains how creatures come to be. Goodness is perfection that ulti-
mately makes metaphysical reference to being. The Metaphysics of the Divine 
Creation revolves around the principles by which the Universe is an actual 
reality. The discourse around the created being rather than excluding the no-
108 wiPPeL, 2007, p. 230.
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tion of Goodness actually includes it. Indeed something is said to be good in 
so far as it is real or actual. Aquinas demonstrates the intimate relationship 
that exists between the good and the being:
«Furthermore, the good is that which all things desire but all things, each accor-
ding to its mode, desire to be in act; this is clear from the fact that each thing 
according to its nature resists corruption. To be in act, therefore, constitutes 
the nature of good» 109.
Here Aquinas is testimony to the fact that the transcendental properties 
of reality are convertible among them: Bonum et ens convertuntur. Goodness 
is a transcendental property of the being. Goodness is being in so far as 
this is desired as an end by a particular will. Moreover that good which all 
reality fundamentally desire or will is their actuality or being. This, esse, is 
the ultimate desirable perfection. To be is the essential nature of the good. 
For this reason, the Principle of the Free and Intelligent Creation of the 
Universe by God reaches its base in the metaphysical consideration of how 
the created being comes to be. God is the Pure Act devoid of any potency. 
When he creates, therefore, he does not seek to fulfil any intrinsic potency. 
Aquinas maintains that the Creator and the creature pertain to two distinct 
orders of reality.
We now arrive at the question that attempts to take account of the 
self-diffusive nature of good which at the end of the day is the being and the 
fact that creatures are really radically distinct from their Creator. In this ques-
tion is concealed the clue to the fact that the Divine Creation must be free and 
intelligent. Is God really related to creatures as the axiom Bonum diffusivum 
sui, understood as an efficient causality, would contemplate? And if not, then 
how would the goodness which is the being, then, diffusive itself?
In the order of the cause-effect relationship, the agent cause is really 
present in its effect because it is somewhat ordered to it; firstly because an 
agent produces its likeness and so perpetuates its species in what Rosemann de-
notes as the Law of Synonymy 110, secondly because the agent is itself moved 
109 S.c.G., lib. I cap. 37 n. 4.
110 Cfr. roSemann, 1996, pp. 52-57. «Finally, we should not forget that the law of synonymy is the 
transposition upon the level of efficient causality of all-pervasive finality of the universe, namely, 
to mirror and imitate the eternal and divine» (p. 62)
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by another and thirdly because the agent perfects itself in producing the 
effect. Nevertheless Aquinas asserts that creation is not anything real in the 
Creator but a rational relation 111. This is possible because: «There are some 
things to which others indeed are ordered, and not conversely, because they 
are wholly outside that genus of actions or virtues which such order fol-
lows» 112.
Given the fact that God only possesses a rational relation to the created 
Universe, it can then be concluded that the action by which this Universe 
comes to be is not a transitive action by God. How can this be? Aquinas em-
ploys the example of the act of knowing so as to demonstrate that they are 
actions which, although making reference to the world external to the agent 
(in this case the knowing soul), do not and cannot however come into material 
contact with this agent. The soul and the real object pertain to different orders 
of being 113.
God does not have a real relation with the created Universe. At the same 
time, the very act of the Divine Creation as we have seen is immediate, instan-
taneous and direct. In Q.D.P., question 7 article 10, Aquinas, upon affirming 
that God act without any intermediary 114, effectively denies any transitive ac-
tion in God 115. But then he adds: «But what God does outside himself, he under-
stand and wills».
111 Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 3 co: «Whence it must be that the relation by which the creature is referred to the 
creator is real, but in God it is only a logical relation».
112 Q.D.P., q. 7 a. 10 co. [Le relazioni che affermano tra Dio e la creatura non sono reali in lui. Per aver 
chiaro questo bisogna sapere che una relazione reale consiste nell’ordine di una cosa ad un’altra, come si è 
detto. Si trova una relazione reale solo in quei casi nei quali l’ordine dell’uno all’altro dipende dalla stessa 
ragione... Nelle relazioni che si stabiliscono a partire dall’azione e dalla passione o dalla virtù attiva e 
passiva non sempre l’ordine del movimento è univoco... Dio non agisce attraverso un’azione mediata da 
intendersi come promanante da Dio e tesa a terminare nella criatura: il suo agire è la sua sostanza e tutto 
ciò che è in esso è del tutto fuori dal genere della creazione, in forza del quale la creatura si relaziona con 
Dio] (Source: La Potenza di Dio, translated by Angelo Campodonico, a cura di, Nardini Editore, 
Firenze 1995, pp. 196-198) 
113 S.c.G., lib. II cap. 12 n. 3: «God stands in relation to other beings as the knowable... But although 
a thing is said to be knowable in relation to knowledge, the relation is not really in the knowable 
but only in the knowledge».
114 Q.D.P., q. 7 a. 10 co. (Dio non agisce attraverso un’azione mediata da intendersi come promanante da 
Dio e tesa a terminare nella criatura: il suo agire è la sua sostanza...)
115 Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 15 co: «The fourth argument is that, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 
IX, action is twofold: one which remains in the agent itself, and is the perfection and act of the 
agent, as for example, to understand, to will, and the like; and another which issues from the 
agent into an extrinsic patient, and is the perfection and act of the patient, as for example, to 
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According to Aquinas, therefore, the fact that an agent acts in an im-
manently is substantiation that this agent is free and intelligent because the 
constituent elements of the immanent action are to understand and to will. 
But that an agent acts immanently does not exclude the possibility that it 
may act extrinsically as is the case of the human person. Nevertheless, Aqui-
nas is quite explicit that God does not act in a transitive manner 116. The ac-
tion of God is neither ordered towards the created Universe as if this would 
benefit him in any way nor is He moved by another to create. The analogy 
of the knower-known object in order to describe the immanent nature of the 
act is not sufficient in the case of God. This is because in the Divine Sub-
ject, there is a perfect identity between the knowing subject and the known 
object 117. God, in knowing his essence, knows all things. The intrigue of the 
Aquinas position regarding the uniquely immanent action by God is truly 
noteworthy.
Therefore if the Divine Action is by nature immanent, that is non-tran-
sitive, how does Aquinas resolve the question of the Divine Creation which 
by definition involves the production of being distinct from God’s? In order 
to resolve this dilemma, Selner, reverts to Aristotle’s account of the imma-
nent and transitive natures of action. She notes that the denial that the Divine 
Creation is the result of a transitive action directly denies the fact that created 
being is produced 118. In this very denial is an implicit claim that the creative 
act is not ultimate ordered to the production of creatures, but rather for sake 
of the Divine Goodness. This is the finality of the creative act whose author 
is God. «Creatures are indeed a result of this activity, but God’s act is not 
ordered to them as such, but to his own goodness... God is his own end. As a 
purely actual being he and his activity can be ordered to only one thing, and 
that is himself. His activity may be productive of something other, but that 
heat, to move, and the like. Now God’s action cannot be understood to be of the second kind 
of action because, since his action is his potency, it does not issue forth from him. And so his 
action must be understood as the first kind, which is found only in intelligent and voluntary 
agents».
116 Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 15 co: «Now God’s action cannot be understood to be of the second kind of action 
because, since his action is his potency, it does not issue forth from him. And so his action must 
be understood as the first kind, which is found only in intelligent and voluntary agents».
117 S.Th., Ia q. 14 a. 6 co. (Et sic omnia in Deo præexistunt, non solum quantum ad id quod commune est 
omnibus, sed etiam quantum ad ea secundum quae res distinguuntur)
118 Cfr. SeLner, 1998, pp. 249-250.
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other is not in itself the end of this activity. Further, in creation there is no 
‘other’ which receives God’s act and is perfected by it, as in a transitive act. The 
other is rather wholly constituted by this act» 119.
This position regarding the deliberation of the immanent and transitive 
actions in God is a commendable synthesis of: 1) the original Aquinas vision 
of Bonum diffusivum sui as only making reference to the Final Causality of the 
Divine Goodness with respect to creatures, and 2) the blatant Efficient Cau-
sality explanation of the created goodness which the Universe is testimony 
of. Our conclusion from the above consideration is that the created Universe 
is simply an accidental effect of the Divine Creative Action. Nevertheless, that 
the creative act should produce creatures only accidentally and not substan-
tially still remains mind-boggling! Why then would it be called creative if its 
principal finality is not the universal production of creatures? Selner gives the 
following response: «»Based on Thomas’ understanding of God as infinitely 
actual, we must hold that ‘the teleological relation’ of creation terminates in 
his infinite actuality and so it can be understood as an immanent act, though 
one which is so rich as to produce effects beyond the action which are able 
then themselves to be» 120.
«And so we see that because the Createdness of things demands that the 
causal role of the first cause be expanded over that envisioned by Aristotle, 
his understanding of immanent and transitive action must also be ‘expand-
ed’ to encompass the activity of creation 121. By distinguishing between the 
logical relation of God to creature and the real relation of creature to God, 
by maintaining the ‘immanence’ of God’s activity, Thomas avoids the ‘con-
tamination’ so feared by Avicenna... Thus God’s radical otherness is pre-
served and our understating of it is enhanced by facing up to the challenge 
it seems to come under in holding for creation» 122. Therefore, the Divine 
Creative Act does not fall within the Aristotelian description of the Transitive 
action.
119 SeLner, 1998, pp. 250-251. Selner makes reference to the definition of the Transitive action as 
«any action which consists in the production of an effect» whereby consists in necessarily means 
finalised in. Therefore to deny that the creative action is transitive is to deny that it consist in the 
production of creatures as this were the unique rationale of this Divine Action.
120 SeLner, 1998, p. 251.
121 Cfr. Metaphysics, IX, 8, 1050a24.
122 SeLner, 1998, p. 252.
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the PrinciPLe oF reLation in the divine creation
1. the created act oF beinG: bona Fide eFFect 
oF the act oF the divine creation
In this sub-chapter we study the implications of the traditional notions 
of Participation and Esse commune, two concepts closely related to each other 
and commonly employed so in the description of the Divine Creation 123. Pres-
ent-day authors are of the view that the concept of Esse commune fails to bring 
out adequately the radical distinction between the Divine being and the created 
being 124. Thomas Aquinas affirms that the fact that the created being is the ef-
fect of causality makes it radically different in nature from the being of God 125.
a) From the conceptual Esse Commune towards the Esse Creatum
The very possibility of attributing any common property to reality means 
that each entity of reality must possess this property but only partially. If any 
particular being were to possess it fully, then this property would no longer 
be common. Here in lies the magnificent and fine distinction between the 
notions of Commonness and Participation. If a certain being, A, fully possess 
a certain property, P, and another being, B, also possesses the same property, 
then P is not common to A and B given that A does not share in P but pos-
sesses it fully. It is B therefore that participates in P. The distinction between 
Commonness and Participation is so radical that it can be truly affirmed that 
the nature of P in A is completely distinct from the nature of P in B 126.
According to Llano, the notion of Participation is so intimately linked to 
the Divine Creation that in the created being (esse creatum), the two notions 
are identical. Creation is not a mere «factum» –an ontological state or occur-
rence– but rather a stable and positive situation or condition, in the same way as 
the participated actus essendi that confers existence upon each created reality is 
stable and positive 127.
123 See Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 5 co.
124 Pérez Guerrero, 1996, pp. 27-29.
125 Cfr. S.c.G., lib. II cap. 15 n. 2.
126 For this reason when we speak of the dissimilarity between the being of God and that of created 
reality, it is proper to speak of ‘distinction’ rather than ‘difference’ so as to further highlight this 
infinite disparity in order of reality between God and creation.
127 Cfr. LLano, a., Metaphysics and Language, Georg Olms verlag Hildesheim, New York 2005, p. 297.
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Referring to the distinct nature between God and creation, Aquinas makes 
the following parallelism: «It is therefore impossible that a certain property 
be a predicate of two realities and that in neither of them be predicated in the 
form of cause. Rather it is necessary that (the property) in one of the realities 
be the cause of the other. However, being is the predicate of all that is. It is 
therefore impossible that there be two realities that do not have the cause of 
being; rather it is precise that one of them be the cause of the other» 128. The 
nature of divine being is absolutely different from that of the created being 
because God is the cause of the created being which subsists only as an effect.
The blend between the ideas of the divine necessity and the created con-
tingency in the Divine Creation, as sustained by the notions of the Divine 
Transcendence and the Participation of the created being, has not always been 
well understood. Propositions such as the Process Theology find contradic-
tion in the fact that the Necessary God can know and cause contingent cre-
ation 129. Thanks to the doctrine of Participation, the notion of the Divine 
Creation properly associates with the Neo-Platonic Philosophy according to 
which the creature, due to its esse creatum, participates, though imperfectly, in 
the Divine Being. For this reason, creatio ex nihilo denotes the very relation of 
this new being to God 130.
Being is the most fundamental aspect of universal reality. It pertains to 
both God the Creator and creatures. However the being of God is radically 
distinct from the created being. God is that reality whose essence is to be. 
He is Actus Essendi Purus, the Pure Act of Being. The created being, on the 
other hand, is graduated according to an ontological hierarchy. We therefore 
speak of the analogy of being in a two-fold way: Firstly, in the sense that being 
is a property that all reality or existence possesses, be it God or creation; and 
secondly, within created reality or esse creatum which exists in the hierarchy 
of existence. The latter hierarchy, by which certain created beings participate 
in a more intense manner in esse creatum than others, is non-existent in the 
128 S.c.G., lib. II cap. 15 n. 2. (Impossibile est igitur aliquod unum de duobus praedicari ita quod de neutro 
per causam dicatur, sed oportet vel unum esse alterius causam ‘Esse’ autem dicitur de omni eo quod est. 
Impossibile est igitur esse aliqua duo quorum neutrum habeat causam essendi, sed oportet utrumque 
acceptorum esse per causam, vel alterum alteri esse causam essendi)
129 Cfr. LauGhLin, P., «Divine Necessity and Created Contingency in Aquinas», The Heythrop 
Journal, 50 (2009) 648-649.
130 Cfr. Soto-bruna, m., «Causalidad y manifestación en el Neoplatonismo Medieval», Anuario 
Filosófico, 44 (2011) 25.
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analogy of being between God and creature. This is because God is absolutely 
transcendent.
The notion of being is the same in definition but distinct in sense or 
nature between God and creation. As we have seen, even among particular 
creatures there is a hierarchy. For this reason, Aertsen affirms that the con-
ception of ‘commonness’ in St. Thomas is complex. The distinctive feature 
of his transcendental way of thought is that it is bi-directional –toward the 
transcendentality of being and toward that which is common by causality– 131.
According to Laughlin, there is not any contradiction with respect to 
the co-presence of the divine necessity (owed to the Transcendentality) and 
the contingency (due to Participation) in Aquinas’ Metaphysics of Creation 
according to whom the divine necessity should be understood as ontologi-
cal necessity. The very existence of contingent esse creatum pre-supposes the 
ontologically necessary being that is uncaused. It is important to realize that 
the argument shifts from the logical order to the existential one –the order of 
causality–. The introduction of an ontological hierarchy in effect qualitatively 
separates the God (cause) from the created being (effect). God is distinct from 
the created being not because of magnitude or any comparison with creature 
but according to his existence (essence) 132.
Though harmonized by the analogy of being, esse creatum, as portrayed 
by Aertsen, is necessarily and radically distinct from the being of God. Esse 
creatum is not simply a logical concept (a Platonic tendency) but is eventually 
realized in individual and particular real beings (the approach of Aristotle). 
It is a metaphysical principle. The distinction, therefore between Esse, the 
transcendent Being of God, and esse commune, the created being, pertains to 
the order of causality 133. God causes the created being. Being, on the other 
hand, can only said to be ‘common’ because nothing can be called an existent 
unless it possesses it.
In the words of Ocáriz, the esse of creatures is participated because the 
Divine Creation is not only an extrinsic causality (manifested in its transcend-
ence) but also an intrinsic one. God, as efficient cause, acts ab intra unlike 
other efficient causes that necessarily act outside the effect. Both natures of 
131 Cfr. aertSen, 1996, p. 394.
132 Cfr. LauGhLin, 2009, p. 650.
133 Cfr. aertSen, 1996, p. 389.
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causality –intrinsic and extrinsic– are mutually contemporaneous in the Di-
vine Creation 134.
It is a long-standing argument that the proper finality of the act of 
the Divine Creation is the Created being (esse creatum). Aquinas argues that 
from an agent of a particular nature proceeds the effect of similar nature. 
This thesis is governed by the postulate: Every agent produces its likeness. 
However, as we have seen in the previous chapter above, the Aquinas posi-
tion as to whether the Divine Creative Act is totally immanent or transitive 
remains open to a two-fold interpretation: Creatures act in immanent and 
transitive manner but distinctly. In an immanent way, for example when man 
thinks or produces ideas. Creatures act transitively because they cannot give 
origin to what they produce in the fundamental sense of being; they always 
produce things from other things. The single creative act of God combines 
both the immanent and transitive natures of act because in creating the Di-
vine being produces being in the most fundamental sense (immanence); at 
the same time the effect of the creative act in an external product, the esse 
creatum (hence a transitive action). While some of the present-day Thomist 
philosophers hold that God’s action is totally immanent and as such the cre-
ated being is only a by-effect of the Divine creative action 135, Aquinas also 
categorically states that the effect of the creative action is the production of 
the esse creatum. He calls this the proper effect of the Divine Action of crea-
tion in the words he employs in the Second article of the seventh question 
of Q.D.P. 136.
Furthermore, and in perhaps the strongest terms so far regarding the 
principal efficient causality of the act of the Divine Creation, Aquinas adds 
that the very definition (ratio) of the Divine Creation is the production of 
134 Cfr. ocáriz, F., Naturaleza, Gracia y Gloria, Eunsa, Pamplona 2000, pp. 23-24. For this very 
reason St. Augustine says that God is more intimate to creatures than the creatures themselves.
135 SeLner, 1998, p. 251.
136 Q.D.P., q. 7 a. 2 co. (Source: <www.corpusthomisticum.org/qdp7.html>, 27, Apr-2011): «A 
cause must therefore exist, one that is higher than all other causes, a cause from which these 
receive being and whose proper effect is being itself. This cause is God»
 [Inoltre l’effecto proprio di una qualunque causa procede da essa stessa second la similitudine della sua 
natura. Bisogna allora che quanto è essere sia sostanza o natura di Dio. In forza de ciò il Libro delle cause 
afferma che intelligenza non dà l’essere se non in quanto è divina e che il primo effecto è l’essere e prima 
di lui non c’è alcuna realtà creata] (Source: La Potenza di Dio, translated by Angelo Campodonico, 
a cura di, Nardini Editore, Firenze 1995, pp. 137-138) 
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being as such, not the production of this or that other particular being 137. Fabro 
corroborates this position: «Esse is the act of all essence and form, and in the 
same manner as the form is the act of matter, and the production of the act is 
the finality of all action of the agent. The most supreme act is esse, by means of 
which all other act is actualized, substantial or accidental, which is the proper 
and immediate effect of God» 138.
As we have seen in the First chapter above, the Divine Creation is an 
act whose unique agent is God. He is the Pure Act of Being. He therefore 
acts according to the fullness of being. The proper effect of the Pure Act is 
being itself (esse proprium). The cause-effect relationship that arises from the 
Divine Creative Act abides by the metaphysical axiom, Omne agens agit sibi 
simile, at least in so far as this plays testimony to the Law of Synonymy by 
which an agent perpetuates its species though the efficient causality 139. Ac-
cording to a conceptual distinction, in order for an effect to be ‘something’, 
it first of all has ‘to be’. For this reason, we say that the first conceptual effect 
that is unreservedly above all other effects and included in them all is ‘to be’. 
According to Aertsen, created being as act of existence is not identical to a 
created object –«but the proper aspect (ratio) of the object of creation–. For 
a thing is called created because it is a being (ens), not because it is this being 
(hoc ens)» 140.
Indeed, St. Thomas in the Fourth approach of demonstrating the exist-
ence of God as the First Universal Cause (Prima Causa Universitatis Rerum), 
bases his thesis on the fact that the participated or created being is immedi-
ately caused by God who is the Pure Act of Being (Ipsum Esse Subsistens). God 
brings to existence the Universe in so far as he directly causes its being 141. 
The Universal Created Being is what Aquinas refers to as esse commune. He 
describes esse in commune as follows:
«If something is found to be common to many things, it is necessary that 
it be caused in them by one cause, for it is not possible that the common 
feature belong in common to each one in itself, since each one, according 
137 S.Th., Ia q. 45 a. 5 co. (Producere autem esse absolute, non inquantum est hoc vel tale, pertinet ad 
rationem creationis)
138 Fabro, c., Participación y Causalidad según Tomás de Aquino, Eunsa, Pamplona 2009, p. 331.
139 Cfr. roSemann, 1996, p. 62.
140 aertSen, 1996, p. 390.
141 Cfr. GonzáLez, A. L., Teología Natural, Eunsa, Pamplona 2008, p. 223.
CUADERNOS DOCTORALES DE LA FACULTAD ECLESIáSTICA DE FILOSOFíA / vOL. 24 / 2014 257
The AcT of Being, free will & inTelligence And relATion As The firsT PrinciPles...
to what is in itself, is distinct from the others, and diversity of causes would 
produce diverse effects. Therefore, since being is found to be common to all 
things, which are in themselves distinct from one another, it necessarily fo-
llows that it is to be attributed to them not as from them in themselves, but 
from one cause» 142.
Creatures participate in esse commune in the sense that each creature 
merely shares in it without fully possessing it. Esse commune, though it does 
not exist apart from the particular or individual beings, cannot be unique-
ly attributed to any one of them 143. The postulate of Plato (ratio Platonis) is 
the Unity-Multiplicity Dialectic. In it the Greek thinker affirms that what is 
common to many must necessarily have a single cause extrinsic to each of 
the individual members of the multiple. A common essential attribute cannot 
pertain to the individuals of distinct natures in the same manner. Each individ-
ual must possess this one attribute according to its nature. For this reason, the 
common attribute must originate from a unique cause. With this postulate, 
Plato introduces us to the notion of the Common Being or esse commune. The 
Platonic argument considers the Universe as unity of perfection in a diversity 
of subjects 144.
b)  The concept of Createdness & the speculative distinction between the Divine 
Being and the Created being
In Platonism, ‘being’ is perfection separate from the material reality. It 
therefore concludes that «... since being is found to be common to all things, 
which are in themselves distinct from one another, it necessarily follows that 
it is to be attributed to them not as from them in themselves, but from one 
cause» 145. As a consequence, the two ideas of Platonism that have profoundly 
influenced the Metaphysics of the Divine Creation are hereby perceptible:
1) The notion of Esse commune, and
2) The idea of being as a separated perfection (perfectio separata).
142 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 5 co.
143 Cfr. SeLner, 1998, p. 22.
144 Cfr. GonzáLez, A. L., Ser y Participación: Estudio sobre la cuarta vía de Tomás de Aquino, Eunsa, 
Pamplona 1979, p. 126: «The dialectic of the one and the multiple supposes two things in the 
Aquinas formulation – diversity of subjects and unity of perfection»
145 Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 5 co.
Crispus Kinuthia Kinyanjui
258 CUADERNOS DOCTORALES DE LA FACULTAD ECLESIáSTICA DE FILOSOFíA / vOL. 24 / 2014
These are nevertheless widely assumed by St. Thomas Aquinas, especial-
ly when he speaks of being as that which is common to all things 146. It is in fact 
very difficult to make out when Aquinas employs being as perfectio separata or 
when he employs it as simply ‘the act of existing’.
Is the notion of the Esse Commune sustainable in a realistic Metaphysics of 
the Divine Creation? Our view is the negative. Reality does not exist in com-
monness because God does not create any commonness. Were the contrary 
true, then there would have to be a further agent (creation through mediation) 
that apportions this common being to the individual creatures of which the 
Universal creation is composed. We know, however, that the Divine Creation 
is direct and immediate 147. Nevertheless, while creatures owe their existence 
directly to God, we must steer clear of the position that views God as a contin-
ual efficient cause of every single aspect of reality. God is the ultimate source 
of all existence. In this sense, each creature ultimately depends upon God for 
its existence. It is an eventual dependence not sequential one; as if God were 
the first in a chain of causes. Creatures cannot in se give account of their ex-
istence. They ultimately depend upon God for their being. This is what the 
Divine Creation means.
Aquinas in the Summa Theologiæ well expresses the fact that while each 
and every creature is the product of the creative act, the Divine Creative Ac-
tion is nevertheless not a persistent intervention of God in reality. The Divine 
Creation is closely associated to the sustenance of the Universal creation in 
existence: «Creation is the production of being as such, not the production of 
this or that other particular being» 148. A similar observation is made by Jan 
Aertsen when he says that the created being as act of being is not identical to 
146 Cfr. S.c.G., lib. II cap. 15 n. 4. (Omnibus autem commune est esse)
147 Cfr. S.c.G., lib. II cap. 19 n. 6. Aquinas notes that the act of the Divine Creation is instantaneous 
and immediate: «Succession in the production of things is necessary owing to defect of the 
matter which initially is not sufficiently disposed for the reception of the form. Hence, when the 
matter is perfectly disposed for the form, it receives it in an instantaneous manner. Thus because 
a diaphanous or transparent medium is always in final disposition for light, it immediately 
illuminates in the presence of actual light... However in creation nothing is prerequisite on 
the part of matter, nor is anything wanting in the agent so as to act that it acquires posterior 
through this movement... It then follows that creation takes place instantaneously. A creature is 
at once in the act of being created and is created, as (the diaphanous) illuminates as it is being 
illuminated»
148 Cfr. S.Th., Ia q. 45 a. 5 co. (Producere autem esse absolute, non inquantum est hoc vel tale, pertinet 
ad rationem creationis)
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the created object, «but the proper aspect (ratio) of the object of creation. For 
a thing is called created because it is a being (ens), not because it is this being 
(hoc ens)» 149. Consequently, the thesis of the esse commune as an explanation 
of the universal product of the creative act of God proves insufficient. We 
nonetheless affirm that the Divine Creation is not an act of particularisation 
of being into individuals because the Divine Potency is universal. Rather, the 
creative act is the metaphysical ascription of the Universal existence to God.
In the Summa contra Gentiles, the Unity-Multiplicity Dialectic takes a 
different stride. Here Aquinas argues that an attribute cannot concur in dis-
tinct realities equivocally, but solely analogically 150. This argument attributes 
unity of cause to real being or reality. Indeed the analogical view is one that 
does not sustain the conception of a ‘commonness of being’. Analogy refers to 
similarity and distinctness according to different manners of speaking; never 
sameness, it follows that the Divine Being cannot be in any way identified with 
the created being; not even hierarchically. Employed to our present concern, 
the analogical argument affirms that the natures of existence of two distinct re-
alities must be as cause in one and effect in another 151. The unity of existence 
between these two realities, incorrectly called the Esse Commune, is simply 
analogical. It is the unity of the created being in the relation of real inherent 
dependence upon the Divine Being.
The analogical argument is very useful in the Metaphysics of the Divine 
Creation because it eludes the misconceptions of the ideas of the esse commune 
and the ‘hierarchy of the perfection of being’ bring with them while at the 
same time attesting to a real unity or relation of the Universal existence, God and 
the Universe. While Platonism cannot be said to directly embrace a panthe-
istic stand whereby the Universal reality is a hierarchy of unique perfection 
which is being, common to all that exists but perfectly so in God; it is very 
ambiguous regarding how God can be perfectio separata and at the same time 
share in the nature of universal existence through a hierarchy of perfection. 
This lack of distinction may result in a pantheistic understanding of the Uni-
149 Cfr. aertSen, 1996, p. 390.
150 Cfr. S.c.G., lib. II cap. 15 n. 2.
151 Cfr. S.c.G., lib. II cap. 15 n. 2 (Esse autem dicitur de omni eo quod est. Impossibile est igitur esse aliqua 
duo quorum neutrum habeat causam essendi, sed oportet utrumque acceptorum esse per causam, vel 
alterum alteri esse causam essendi... Non enim de multis æquivoce dicitur, sed per analogiam: et sic oportet 
fieri reductionem in unum)
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versal creation. As González observes, «That God be the One, pure and un-
adulterated, does not exhaust the rejoinder, speculatively speaking, to the en-
quiry into why this One is God, but as Gilson remarks, it is undoubtedly part 
of the response; the (common) perfection of being participated in a hierarchy 
leads, through the Unity-Multiplicity Dialectic, to the most pure one, from 
which flows out the being and other perfections» 152. It is therefore critical, as 
we shall see, to make a radical distinction between God and the creatures at 
the most metaphysical echelon, that is, at the order of the esse. This is the basis 
of our critique of the concept of the Esse Commune. The most fundamental 
attribute of any reality cannot admit gradation because each change of what is 
the most essential results in a completely different reality altogether.
Indeed it is proper to the Metaphysics of the Divine Creation to make a 
speculative distinction between the two realities, namely the Divine Being and 
the created being. We observe that the absence of this elemental distinction 
results in the consideration of one unique being (esse simpliciter) as that sole 
act of being by which each and every real being (ente) is. This esse simpliciter 
is subsequently classified as limited-unlimited; participated-non-participated; 
finite-infinite or imperfect-perfect depending on whether it is referred to God 
or the creatures. As a consequence, the lack of distinction between the Divine 
Being and the created being in the conception of the esse simpliciter, the crea-
ture has been incorrectly comprehended as habens esse. This is interpreted to 
mean that the created reality is not identical to esse but rather has or possesses 
esse, while God the Creator is this esse by essence. «The ente (the Created 
being), therefore, is not its esse but rather it is habens esse. The esse of the ente is 
partial given that it is not the plenitude of being, either intensively given that 
it is the esse of something particular (quidditas), or extensively because there 
are other beings that possess this esse. It can therefore be said that ens habet esse 
partialiter, that is, ente is by participation» 153.
If the act of being is the most fundamental element that constitutes any 
reality, it cannot merely be possessed. It is what confers reality to any being. 
Therefore, to say that a creature ‘has’ esse implies that there must be a prior 
subject that is capable to receive this possession; a hypothesis that is contrary to 
the fact that the act of being is the most fundamental metaphysical constituent 
152 Cfr. Ser y Participación: Estudio sobre la cuarta vía de Tomás de Aquino, pp. 129-130.
153 Ser y Participación: Estudio sobre la cuarta vía de Tomás de Aquino, p. 180.
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of any real being. For this very reason, the creature is constituted in and by 
its own being which identifies itself with the creature. The creature does not 
possess partiality of esse (esse partialiter) 154. Consequently, the Metaphysics of 
the Divine Creation must affirm that the created act of being (esse creatum) is 
really and speculatively distinct from the Divine Act of Being (Esse Divinum). 
Creatures do not simply possess the created being but are constituted in it 
through the Principle of Causality.
The idea of Createdness in the Metaphysics of the Divine Creation has 
certain unprecedented repercussions upon Aquinas’ speculation of the act of 
being-essence composition (compositio esse-essentia) of the Universal created ex-
istence. The Act of being (actus essendi) is, in the metaphysical conception, the 
most fundamental order of reality. The Essence is the second metaphysical 
order of existence. It is an attribute of all realities distinct from God 155. The 
concept of the act of being is a higher metaphysical principle in comparison to 
the essence 156. The created existence is a metaphysical composition between 
esse and essentia. «The essence and the act of being are not two entities but 
rather two principles that constitute particular reality» 157. The Divine Being is 
really and therefore speculatively distinct from the created being –means that 
Esse Separatum cannot merely be explained away as the disunion of esse from 
the essence– 158.
c) The Metaphysical Implications of the Paradigm Shift
Esse Separatum is so because it does not depend upon any other reality 
for its being. It is the Independent Being: «what is of interest at the moment 
154 Cfr. GonzáLez, 2000, p. 120.
155 Cfr. aquinaS, T., El ente y la Esencia, traducción, estudio preliminar y notas de Eudaldo Forment, 
Eunsa, Pamplona 2011, pp. 71-72: «Aquinas considers the act of being (esse) as: the ‘act of the 
essence’, the act of act of the essences or forms. An act which, though not ‘essential act’, is 
nevertheless possessed by those acts that constitute the essence... The first function of esse is to 
bring to existence or realize a particular being (ente) in reality»
156 Forment notes that the essence and the act of being do have the same relationship as that 
between matter and form or even that of substance-accident because the two constituent 
principles of ente are not only different but moreover pertain to distinct orders of reality (See El 
ente y la Esencia: Traducción, estudio preliminar y notas de Eudaldo Forment, p. 73).
157 El ente y la Esencia, traducción, estudio preliminar y notas de Eudaldo Forment, Eunsa, Pamplona 
2011, p. 72.
158 Cfr. GonzáLez, 2000, p. 119.
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is to establish whether it is correct to sustain as real truth the fact that the 
unity of a perfection can be found in a separated and composed manner, or, 
viewed differently, if we can consider the separation and composition as dif-
ferent states of the same perfection. It is our position that such a postulate is not 
acceptable within the margin of the Aquinas Philosophy. A perfection that can 
be multiplied among distinct subjects, can only be considered as separated in 
the intellect given that were it real existence it could not be multipliable... Par-
ticipation comprehended in this manner is contrary to reason when speaking 
of predicament participation, that is, the participation of diverse species by 
their inferiors. Moreover this hypothesis is contrary to the Christian Doctrine 
when reference is made to the participation of the divine perfection by crea-
tures» 159.
It is more congruent to the Metaphysics of the Divine Creation to 
affirm that the created being is dependent than to affirm that it is imperfect 
(according to Platonic Participation) with respect to the Divine Being. De-
pendence is more proper a characteristic of that reality that is distinct from 
the Divine Nature. God does not work imperfections, but yes, He is the 
sustenance of all that exists. This is a propinquity to the perpetual specula-
tion of the creative action of God and its implications upon Metaphysics. It 
is therefore incorrect to affirm that the created act of being, though being 
the most elemental act of all creatures, can subsist separated from God 160. 
Only the Divine Act of Being possesses the characteristic of total independ-
ence.
In the quest to bring the notion of Createdness to the forefront of met-
aphysical speculation regarding the Divine Creation, we need to draw certain 
distinctions between intricate terms, views and propositions. If such distinc-
tions are not made, language itself may prove an obstacle to such science. For 
this reason, there is a demand for a general appraisal of the notion of Partic-
ipation, an indispensable principle in the explanation of that Divine Action 
which is creative in character.
159 Pérez Guerrero, 1996, pp. 27-29.
160 Cfr. GonzáLez, 2000, p. 119. Here González adopts the reflection of Fabro who, in conformity 
with the Classical Pure Metaphysics, affirms that the act of being is the unique act among the 
various species of act such as the form or essence that can exist in a separate manner. While 
this affirmation is true in a distinction between esse and essentia, it becomes problematic in the 
speculation of the Divine Creation.
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2. the notion oF ParticiPation in aquinaS’ metaPhySicS 
oF creation: an aPPraiSaL
It is necessary to make evermore present the notion of Createdness as the 
fundamental proposal of the Metaphysics of the Divine Creation. The radical 
real distinction between the Divine Being and the created being deters any 
tendency to comprehend being as a certain perfection whose commonness is 
not only pertinent to creatures but applies to God as well in the most perfect 
manner. Te velde well explains the understanding by the classical Platonism 
of Participation: «What is the meaning of ‘participation’? Thomas begins with 
a kind of etymological explanation: «to participate is, as it were, to take a part 
of something» (partem capere). This is what the term ‘participation’ means. 
We may therefore speak of participation, Thomas goes on, when something 
receives (or: has) in particular fashion what belongs to another universally. 
Thus when a characteristic or perfection is possessed by a subject in only a 
partial or particular fashion, such a subject can be said to participate in that 
perfection. The subject in question is not identical with the perfection it pos-
sesses, which leaves the possibility open for other subjects to share in that 
same perfection» 161.
The above view which advances an understanding of certain «common-
ness of the perfection of being» and consequent participation of the perfec-
tion of being by creatures through deterioration has a strong Neo-platonic 
heritage especially in Boethius. Elements of this thought-position are heavily 
adopted by St. Thomas Aquinas. Some of the clearest manifestations of the 
Platonic Participation include the distinction of the existence of God from 
that of the Universal creation as the following:
– Infinity: finitude of being.
– Perfection: imperfection of being.
– Unlimited: limitation of being.
We see, though in a subtle manner, how the argument of the distinction 
of real being normally reduces itself to one of perfection-imperfection if the 
Divine Being is not speculatively separated from the created being in the most 
preliminary stages of Metaphysics. The pure perfection as such, that is to say, 
perfection in so far as it is pure perfection, the perfection of being considered 
161 te veLde, R., Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, E.J. Brill, New York 1995, p. 11.
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in se, with the proper rationale of its nature as act, cannot be but unique. Nev-
ertheless the perfection of being, the unique pure being (esse) cannot simply 
be a theoretical conception but must exist as such because this esse is the act of 
all acts and forms. The Pure Act of Being (Actus Purus) is the unique act that 
exists separately. The subsistent separate act is God 162.
«The proper rationale of its nature as act» makes esse perfect. This is the 
foundation of the perfection of the act of being. Esse is perfect by its nature of 
act, which is the radical contrary of potency, and this is the most fundamental 
metaphysical distinction of perfection from imperfection. The Unique Divine 
Being (Esse Divinum) is pure and perfect because its proper nature is act. It 
is separated from all other realities because it is uncreated. The created act of 
being (esse creatum) is, in the same way, perfect because it is act. However it is 
not separated but rather dependent upon Esse Divinum, the Creator.
It is not the idea of perfection but rather the idea of Createdness that met-
aphysically distinguishes God from universal creation. Consequently, the view 
that the pure Separated Perfection (Esse Separatum) or the notion of perfectio 
separata is founded upon the absolute and pure perfection of the act of be-
ing 163 is not satisfactory and to a certain extent is inaccurate distinction of God 
from the Universal creation in the Metaphysics of the Divine Creation. Both 
the Divine Act of Being and the created act of being take pleasure in certain 
«absolute and pure perfection» given that they are the first fundamental meta-
physical acts of Divine and created realities respectively. The «separateness of 
Esse Divinum» is therefore ultimately argued out by the notion of Createdness 
–that this being is the Uncreated Being–.
In reality, as we have seen, there is not any commonness of being between 
God and creatures. The Divine Being is the Unique Separated Substance 
while created being is an intrinsic dependence of subsistence upon God. Be-
tween God and creature there is not any relation of commonness but rather 
of dependence. This is a fundamental preliminary distinction. Moreover the 
Universal creation is not any limitation, finitude or imperfection given that it 
is radically distinct from the Divine Being in nature. The Christian Doctrinal 
Teaching plays testimony to the inherent dependence (at the same time as the 
intrinsic perfection) of creatures when it affirms that the creature lacks reason 
162 Cfr. GonzáLez, 2000, p. 119.
163 Cfr. GonzáLez, 2000, p. 119.
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its being (annihilates) without its Creator 164. Furthermore, the ex nihilo fact 
of the Divine Creation is, as we shall see, crucial in order to sustain the thesis 
that creatures are all but a shortfall of that which God possesses in plenitude.
What therefore is the problem with a classical Platonic distinction be-
tween God and creatures? Any sort of distinction between the two realities 
must not insinuate any degradation of being 165. God is the author of the Uni-
versal Creation. It is not proper for God to produce imperfection. Any and all 
procession from the Divine Nature must be perfect, as perfect as can be. The 
realistic Metaphysics of Creation pursued by Aquinas and presently advanced, 
irrefutably highlights the positive nature and sense of the created Universe. 
God does not act by negatives but rather by positives. For this reason, the 
argument by Pérez Guerrero –that the act of creation ex nihilo means that the 
Universal creation is absolute gain– is most sound 166.
a) The Idea of Createdness and the Classical Notion of Participation
In the Fifth article of Q.D.P., question 3, St. Thomas Aquinas responds 
to the dispute regarding whether there can be anything uncreated apart from 
God. This is a crucial question since it goes right down to the crux of the Met-
aphysics of the Divine Creation. It is a question that seeks to inquire whether 
Createdness is in real sense the universal attribute of all reality distinct from God. 
For this reason, this question becomes our point of departure for an evalua-
tion of the notion of Participation. In his response, the Angelic Doctor pre-
dominantly borrows from the thought of three philosophers –Plato, Aristotle 
and Avicenna–. More importantly, however, are their respective arguments.
According to the order of human knowledge, the human person knows 
reality by the initial sensory contact with it. Nevertheless sensory knowledge is 
not only insufficient but somewhat «useless» for man if it does not acquire an 
164 Cfr. vatican counciL ii, Gaudium et Spes – Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, 
n. 36. (Ex ipsa enim creationis condicione res universæ propria firmitate, veritate, bonitate propriisque 
legibus ac ordine intsruuntur... Creatura enim sine Creatore evansescit)
165 The erroneous view of creatures as a degradation of the being which is perfectly found in God is 
a constant peril throughout the History of Philosophy. The fundamental problem that this error 
makes manifest is the lack of comprehension of that the metaphysical notion of Createdness, a 
principle that marks a universal and metaphysical distinction between God and creatures, is real 
and inherent in the very nature of creatures.
166 Cfr. Pérez Guerrero, 1996, p. 35.
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intellectual character. It is for this reason that it can be affirmed that: The uni-
versal (intellectual) knowledge is prior to particular (sensory) knowledge in finality 
while sensory knowledge is anterior to intellectual knowledge in effect. This premise 
is demonstrated by a simple illustration. Through my senses I acquire certain 
perceptions of Socrates –for example, his height, weight, skin colour, etc.–. I 
therefore have effective and immediate sensory knowledge of Socrates. Nev-
ertheless, for a truthful intellectual affirmation or judgment (understanding) 
such as «Socrates is a man», I require the universal awareness of the general 
notion of ‘man’ to which I attribute Socrates.
Is the real Socrates any degradation of the pure universal concept of 
‘man’ in my mind? Certainly it is not. The sensory perception of Socrates is 
an important and indispensable simultaneous complement of the universal con-
ception of ‘man’. The combination of these two attributes, the particular and 
the intellectual, facilitates the acts of judgment, understanding and reflection 
of human rationality.
We present this simple model of the Theory of Knowledge so as to demon-
strate that the particular reality is not in any way inferior to the Universal reality. 
Our underlying argument is the following: reality as the real perfection is con-
crete and particular while concepts such as ‘being’ and ‘existence’ are universal 
and abstract. There cannot, therefore, be any participation by the individual real 
being of an abstract, pure concept. If the Divine Creation by participation is real 
as the notion of Participation asserts, we must be able to explain that:
1) The Divine Being is the source of all creation, and
2) Participation is not an association of the abstract with the real but 
rather real being with real being.
As far as the idea of Perfection is concerned, both the Divine Being and 
the created being are perfection in their own accord. For this reason, the 
distinction between the perfection of God and that of creation is principal-
ly marked by the idea of Createdness. The Divine perfection is uncreated 
while perfection of creatures is created 167. Consequently, the Createdness 
167 To be perfect is to posses in fullness that attribute which in proper to a particular subject; Infinity 
is highly associated with that absence of limits or boundaries as regards a certain attribute, that 
is to say, unlimited. Now then, of both Divine Being and created being can be said ‘is perfect’ or 
‘is infinite’. Created being is absolutely diverse and dynamic and is in this sense infinite. It is at 
the same time perfect because a fundamental aspect of its perfection is that inherent dependence 
upon the Creator.
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is the most radical metaphysical distinction between God and the created 
reality.
God is perfect according to the Uncreated Being, while creatures are 
perfect according to esse creatum. What distinguishes God from creatures is 
not perfection but rather the Createdness. As such creatures are not any deg-
radation of being which finds its perfection or fullness in God. To affirm the 
contrary, one would have to demonstrate that creatures lack certain attribute 
which they merit as creatures 168.
In the commentary to the Fifth article of Q.D.P., question 3: Whether 
Createdness is really the universal attribute of all reality distinct from God, 
Aquinas draws attention to the speculative or abstractive viewpoint of the 
Pre-Socratic philosophers that all real substance is matter while the substan-
tial forms are accidents because they are caused through the «principles of 
substance». These thinkers do not take into consideration the complemen-
tary relationship between the particular knowledge and universal conception. 
According to them, all human knowledge proceeds from sensible being and 
gradually progresses to the intellectual. Nevertheless, sensory knowledge can-
not make any progress towards any universality if it is unaided by the uni-
versal conception of which the human mind is capable (unarguably due to its 
spiritual nature) 169. As a consequence, the ancient thinkers draw an erroneous 
conclusion that matter alone is the substance and unique cause of the Universe 
reality 170. If matter therefore is the unique cause of sensible reality, it is falsely 
concluded that matter is uncreated.
St. Thomas Aquinas makes a critical contribution to the argument when 
he distinguishes between the substantial and the accidental forms. While it is 
true that the accidental forms do not sustain the real existence of matter and 
are contingent to it, the material substance subsists due to its information by a 
168 We can speak of the real Creatural Character that is the distinctive of the Universal existence 
different from God.
169 For this reason, for example, the non-rational animals cannot achieve any universal conception 
or intellectual reflection.
170 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 5 co. The Pre-Socratics proceeded to examine the nature of sensible reality in 
which they were engrossed. This they did through the absraction of forms from this reality. The 
error of the ancient philosophers, however, was the identification all forms with the sensible 
or accidental nature. Their human knowldge was therefore apparently attributed initially to 
the senses and only posteriorly to the intellect. Aquinas, on his part, distinguishes between 
accidental and substantial forms. The former are sensible while the latter are intelligible and 
absolutely inseperable from the true knowledge of the substance.
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substantial form. The Prime Matter cannot therefore be said to be uncreated 
because:
1) The formless Prime Matter does not really exist. The Prime Matter is 
con-created 171;
2) Matter necessarily requires a simultaneous infusion by a substantial 
form in order to subsist.
This infusion is an action inevitably extrinsic to the Matter itself. This 
means that the material substance has a cause external to it. The Material sub-
stance is created. The creation of matter involves the production in existence 
of the material substance whose nature is a composition of the matter and the 
substantial form. The matter may subsequently change its substantial form 
through the natural active causes in which case a new material substance is 
generated, notwithstanding the fact that the original matter is created.
The Pluralist philosophers such as Empedocles take account of the mate-
rial substantial change. Nevertheless they are unable to arrive at the creation 
of matter because, as Aquinas remarks, they are unable to attain the knowl-
edge of this greater universal causality, the Divine Creation, which surpasses 
the natural generation and degradation. They only perceive the generation of 
one particular form or another upon the eternal matter.
The Pre-Socratic philosophers are ultimately overwhelmed by the anal-
ysis of matter and do not attain the universal knowledge of the origin of the 
real material existence. We consequently see here that the consideration of the 
immaterial being is fundamental so as to achieve the true universal knowledge 
of the created reality. The Metaphysics of the Divine Creation, through the 
idea of Createdness, endeavours to emphasize this.
b)  The Ontological Distinctiveness of the Supreme Being (Ens Maxime): 
Plato, Aristotle & Aquinas
Plato and Aristotle achieve a consideration of the universal causality of 
creatures. For this reason, Aquinas adopts their metaphysical reflection be-
cause in it he does not find any contradiction with the Christian Doctrinal 
171 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 1 ad 12; q. 3 a. 5 ad 3; also Kretzmann, 1999, p. 79 (Footnote 19): «Prime 
matter has substantial being through a form, and so it must be the case that it would be created 
under some form. Otherwise it would not be in actuality. However, while existing under one 
form, it is potentiality to others»
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Teaching 172. Well enough for the medieval thinker to seek guarantee of his 
philosophical doctrine in the Revealed Truth. However our present task is to 
make an evaluation of the philosophical position held by St. Thomas Aquinas.
In a different manner, in Aristotle, we find an argument of the universal-
ity of the idea of Createdness in all real being distinct from God. We cannot 
know a truth without knowing its cause. Certain perfection belongs in a high-
er degree to a particular subject if in virtue of it a similar quality belongs to 
another subject. Aristotle gives the example of fire which is the cause of heat in 
all other things and for this very reason is the hottest of things. He therefore 
concludes that the agent who causes derivative truths to be true is most true 173.
With respect to the thesis of Aristotle one fact remains quite clear. He 
speaks about similarity of quality, not sameness of quality. In the example illus-
trated, he does not attribute «fire-ness» to subjects other that the universal 
cause of heat. This is what is called fire. The Strategite employs the example 
of ‘heat’ which is a semblance of the essence that is fire. We therefore firmly 
conclude that the highest agent cause produces only its resemblance, not its 
identity. Indeed the postulate of Aristotle can be employed to the Metaphysics 
of the Divine Creation without facilitating any predisposition to an untrue 
‘commonness of being’.
Nevertheless, there is an apparent ambiguity in the discussion. This am-
biguity is the argument of the Hierarchy of Perfection found in the Fifth ar-
ticle of Q.D.P., question 3. He says that a quality participated by many things 
in various ways must be attributed to all those in which it is found more im-
perfectly by virtue of that in which it is found more perfectly 174. In the original 
wording, Aristotle does not insinuate any derogation of the effect of the agent 
cause as if it were less perfect or even imperfect. He attributes perfection (in 
this case truth) to both cause and effect.
172 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 5 co.
173 Cfr. Metaphysics, II, 1, 993b20.
174 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 5 co. (Secunda ratio est, quia, cum aliquid invenitur a pluribus diversimode 
participatum oportet quod ab eo in quo perfectissime invenitur, attribuatur omnibus illis in quibus 
imperfectius invenitur. Nam ea quae positive secundum magis et minus dicuntur, hoc habent ex accessu 
remotiori vel propinquiori ad aliquid unum: si enim unicuique eorum ex se ipso illud conveniret, non 
esset ratio cur perfectius in uno quam in alio inveniretur; sicut videmus quod ignis, qui est in fine 
caliditatis, est caloris principium in omnibus calidis. Est autem ponere unum ens, quod est perfectissimum 
et verissimum ens: quod ex hoc probatur, quia est aliquid movens omnino immobile et perfectissimum, ut 
a philosophis est probatum. Oportet ergo quod omnia alia minus perfecta ab ipso esse recipiant. Et haec est 
probatio philosophi)
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The reading by Aquinas of this deliberation of Aristotle is without a 
doubt influenced by the Platonic Heritage. Through the latter, Aquinas makes 
reference to a perfection-imperfection distinction absent in the reflection of 
Aristotle. Furthermore, by making this slight but nonetheless significant alter-
ation, Aquinas, in our view, lends the reader the capacity to conclude that he 
is in fact speaking about a common attribute which is most perfect in the agent 
cause and less perfect in its effect. This is confirmed by what he subsequently 
says: «For those things which have something predicated of them to a greater 
or lesser degree, have this in reference to one thing which they approach, one 
nearer than another, because if it belonged to each one in itself, there would 
be no reason why it would be found more perfectly in one than in another» 175.
In the Summa Theologiæ, on the other hand, Aquinas accurately adopts 
the reflection of Aristotle. Plato regards the need for unity in multiplicity (as 
proof of the universality of the idea of Createdness in all reality distinct from 
God) as resolutely based on the notion of Participation of the perfection of 
unique common being according to a hierarchy of perfection. Aristotle, on the 
other hand, holds that the real being which is the Supreme Being who is the 
Supreme Truth is the cause of all other beings and truths 176.
Regarding the concept of the Supreme Being (Ens Maxime) in the Aris-
totle Metaphysics and later taken up in the Metaphysics of the Divine Crea-
tion, Selner affirms that this Being cannot be comprehended according to a 
hierarchy of perfection; as the culmination in a grading of common perfection 
of being. The Supreme Being does not mean the most perfect in the scale or 
gradation of reality but rather an entirely different order of reality 177.
I do not aim here to reproduce her argument but simply to draw atten-
tion to it because it is imperative for our metaphysical study of the Divine 
Creation. «Those things which have being ‘more or less’ must have it from 
175 Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 5 co. (Est autem ponere unum ens, quod est perfectissimum et verissimum ens: quod ex 
hoc probatur, quia est aliquid movens omnino immobile et perfectissimum, ut a philosophis est probatum. 
Oportet ergo quod omnia alia minus perfecta ab ipso esse recipiant)
176 Cfr. S.Th., Ia q. 44 a. 1 c. (Et iterum ostensum est quod esse subsistens non potest esse nisi unum: sicut 
si albedo esset subsistens, non posset esse nisi una, cum albedines multiplicentur secundum recipientia. 
Relinquitur ergo quod omnia alia a Deo non sint suum esse, sed participant esse. Necesse est igitur omnia 
quae diversificantur secundum diversam participationem essendi, ut sint perfectius vel minus perfecte, 
causari ab uno primo ente, quod perfectissime est. Unde et Plato dixit quod necesse est ante omnem 
multitudinem ponere unitatem. Et Aristoteles dicit quod est maxime ens et maxime verum, est causa 
omnis entis et omnis veri...).
177 Cfr. SeLner, 1998, p. 36.
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that which has being in the highest degree». From this postulate of Aristot-
le in the Metaphysics, Book II, and adopted by Aquinas in the Fifth article 
of Q.D.P., question 3, Selner asserts that its interpretation demonstrates the 
absence of a hierarchy of the perfection of being in reality. There is a radical 
distinction between the Divine Being (the Creator) and the created being (the 
creature). Fire is the highest degree of heat because it is the universal cause 
of heat in hot things and merely the hottest among hot things. This is pure 
empirical knowledge. Aquinas however, as Selner notes, applies the same pos-
tulate to being, a metaphysical principle. Since creatures cannot account for 
their own being (as evidenced by their contingency), it follows that this being 
is caused by another subject which on its part must be able to cause being. It 
must be its own being which it cannot merely possess according to a degree 
«more or less». Just as fire is heat in itself (per se ipsa), in the same way the 
Supreme Being that is to the maximum degree, Ens Maxime, is being per se ipsa. 
It is the Divine Being which is a different order of reality. It is what the science 
of Metaphysics calls God 178.
c) The Fourth Way of St. Thomas Aquinas in this respect
In the Fourth Way of the a posteriori proofs of the existence of God (via 
metaphysica par excellence 179), St. Thomas Aquinas affords us a demonstration 
of the necessary and real radical distinction between the Divine Being and 
the created being. This demonstration becomes interesting for our study not 
only because it is argued out from the proposition of the Ens Maxime, but also 
because in it we observe the employment of the Platonic notion of Participa-
tion (God as the pure and separate perfection) alongside the complementary 
metaphysical reflection of the Ontological Being by Aristotle (God as the cause 
of all being, truth, goodness).
In the Summa contra Gentiles, Aquinas, adopting the thought of Aristotle, 
affirms that the reality which is the supreme truth must necessarily be the Su-
preme Being. This being must really exist given that it is the foundation of the 
observable hierarchy of things. The comparison according to «more or less» 
is thus the approximation to the essence of this Supreme Being (the Highest 
178 Cfr. SeLner, 1998, p. 36.
179 Cfr. GonzáLez, 2000, p. 114.
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Truth; simpliciter) 180. It is therefore deduced that there can exist other beings 
apart from the Supreme Being (what we call God) 181. In the Summa Theologiæ, 
Aquinas argues that the Fourth Way is founded upon the ontological hierar-
chy of goodness and truth of real things. Nevertheless any hierarchy makes 
implicit reference to the proximity to that which is the Utmost. There neces-
sarily exists that Supreme Truth and consequently the Supreme Being given 
the fact that truth inevitably implies being. This Supreme Reality is the cause of 
all that belongs to the genre of reality. Therefore there exists a cause of truth, 
goodness and being of all things 182.
The demonstration by Aquinas of the existence of the Supreme Being 
who belongs to a different order of reality from the created Universe is 
therefore hinged on the fact of the Participation by Causality. The Platonic 
Participation is complemented by the truth of creation as the Transcen-
dental Causality of God that produces the creatures. For this reason, it is 
incorrect to metaphysically consider the creatures as inferior perfections of 
the hierarchy of a common being, truth or goodness because this is a con-
clusion exclusively founded in the Platonic Participation whose premise is 
that the only real and true perfection is the perfectio separata. The creatures 
are distinct and novel beings of the Divine Action. In their own right, they 
are being, truth and goodness (and this fact is based on the Principle of 
Causality). As Te velde puts it, «In receiving itself from the divine agent 
the creature is totally new; (...) Creation is not like the past origin of a thing’s 
180 Aristotle affirms that there is a «more and less» in the nature of things, contrary to which it 
would be impossible to, say, compare two things or even to distinguish numerical values and 
calculations. «If, then, that which has more of any quality is nearer to it, there must be some 
truth to which the truer is nearer». (Cfr. Metaphysics, Iv, 4, 1008b31-1009a1)
181 Cfr. S.c.G., lib. I cap. 13 n. 34 (Potest etiam alia ratio colligi ex verbis Aristotelis. In II enim Metaphys. 
ostendit quod ea quae sunt maxime vera, sunt et maxime entia. In IV autem Metaphys. ostendit esse aliquid 
maxime verum, ex hoc quod videmus duorum falsorum unum altero esse magis falsum unde oportet ut 
alterum sit etiam altero verius; hoc autem est secundum approximationem ad id quod est simpliciter et 
maxime verum. Ex quibus concludi potest ulterius esse «aliquid quod est maxime ens». Et hoc dicimus Deum)
182 Cfr. S.Th., Ia q. 2 a. 3 c. (Quarta via sumitur ex gradibus qui in rebus inveniuntur. Invenitur enim in 
rebus aliquid magis et minus bonum, et verum, et nobile; et sic de aliis huiusmodi. Sed magis et minus 
dicuntur de diversis secundum quod appropinquant diversimode ad aliquid quod maxime est: sicut magis 
calidum est, quod magis appropinquat maxime calido. Est igitur aliquid quod est verissimum, et optimum, 
et nobilissimum, et per consequens maxime ens: nam quae sunt maxime vera, sunt maxime entia, ut dicitur 
II Methapys. Quod autem dicitur maxime tale in aliquo genere, est causa omnium quae sunt illius generis: 
sicut ignis, qui est maxime calidus, est causa omnium calidorum, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo est aliquid 
quod omnibus entibus est causa esse, et bonitas, et cuiuslibet perfectionis: et hoc dicimus Deum)
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physical existence; it is the permanent condition of any form of existence in 
the world» 183.
In point of fact there is a considerable difference between the excerpt of 
the Summa contra Gentiles and that of the Summa Theologiæ regarding the Fourth 
Way of the demonstration of the existence of God. In the former citation, the 
notion of the Transcendental Causality is absent. Its argument therefore re-
mains within the realm of the Platonic Participation and inevitable adheres to 
the Hypothesis of the «hierarchy of the perfection of common being» 184. We 
observe the lack of a clear-cut metaphysical distinction between the Highest 
Being (Esse Simpliciter or Maxime Ens) and the created being. The conclusion: 
Ex quibus concludi potest ulterius esse aliquid quod est maxime ens merely affirms that 
there exists other beings distinct from the supreme being and not necessarily 
that this is radically distinct from them ontologically speaking. The absence of 
the notion of Causality in the excerpt of Summa contra Gentiles is also observed 
in the adoption of the Aristotle reflection by St. Thomas Aquinas in the Fifth 
article of Q.D.P., question 3 185. The exclusion of the notion of Causality in the 
rationalization of the Divine Creation deters the proper employment of the 
Platonic Notion of Participation in the Metaphysics of the Divine Creation. On 
the other hand, in the Summa Theologiæ, Aquinas introduces the notion of the 
Transcendental Causality. Through this, he is able to describe God, the Divine 
Being, as the Supreme Being not because He is simply the highest in a hierar-
chy of perfections, but rather because Ens Maxime, the Uncreated Being, is the 
«principle and cause» 186 of the Universal Creation 187.
183 te veLde, 2006, p. 126.
184 Cfr. S.c.G., lib. I cap. 13 n. 34 (... esse aliquid maxime verum, ex hoc quod videmus duorum falsorum 
unum altero esse magis falsum unde oportet ut alterum sit etiam altero verius; hoc autem est secundum 
approximationem ad id quod est simpliciter et maxime verum. Ex quibus concludi potest ulterius esse 
aliquid quod est maxime ens)
185 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 5 co. (Secunda ratio est, quia, cum aliquid invenitur a pluribus diversimode participatum 
oportet quod ab eo in quo perfectissime invenitur, attribuatur omnibus illis in quibus imperfectius invenitur. 
Nam ea quae positive secundum magis et minus dicuntur, hoc habent ex accessu remotiori vel propinquiori ad 
aliquid unum: si enim unicuique eorum ex se ipso illud conveniret, non esset ratio cur perfectius in uno quam 
in alio inveniretur; sicut videmus quod ignis, qui est in fine caliditatis, est caloris principium in omnibus 
calidis. Est autem ponere unum ens, quod est perfectissimum et verissimum ens: quod ex hoc probatur, quia 
est aliquid movens omnino immobile et perfectissimum, ut a philosophis est probatum. Oportet ergo quod 
omnia alia minus perfecta ab ipso esse recipiant. Et haec est probatio philosophi)
186 Cfr. GonzáLez, A. L., Teología Natural, Eunsa, Pamplona 2000, p. 115 (Footnote 139).
187 Cfr. S.Th., Ia q. 2 a. 3 c. (Quod autem dicitur maxime tale in aliquo genere, est causa omnium quae sunt 
illius generis: sicut ignis, qui est maxime calidus, est causa omnium calidorum, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo 
est aliquid quod omnibus entibus est causa esse, et bonitas, et cuiuslibet perfectionis: et hoc dicimus Deum)
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Our appraisal of Aquinas’ position of the notion of Participation in the 
Metaphysics of the Divine Creation has therefore taken up two fronts:
1) The idea of a «hierarchy of perfection», and
2) The idea of a «common attribute» (esse commune).
We nevertheless remain inquisitive in the study of the various excerpts 
of the writings of Aquinas: Is the proposition of the Hierarchy of Perfection 
and the Common Attribute appropriate for the explanation of the Ontological 
Existence?
It is one thing to affirm that the most superior perfection is being, and 
quite another to conclude that God is the highest perfection within the hier-
archy of ‘being’. The metaphysical speculation is quite unanimous about the 
fact that esse (an act per se devoid of all potencies) is the mother of all perfec-
tions. As Fabro puts it, «Esse is the act of all essence and form, and in the same 
manner as the form is the act of matter, and the production of the act is the 
finality of all action of the agent. The most supreme act is esse, by means of 
which all other act is actualized, substantial or accidental, which is the proper 
and immediate effect of God» 188.
The real act of being is the unique undetermined act because it can be 
without any restriction whatsoever. Esse is what ultimately confers all actuality. 
It is the very intimacy of any reality. It is the fixed and stable that constitutes 
the real being 189.
It is indubitable that the real being is perfection because it is act of being. 
Aquinas himself, though at this moment commenting on the correlation of 
act-potency, affirms that being is the most perfect of all things 190. He further 
says: «what I call esse is the actuality of all acts, and on account of this, is the 
perfection of all perfections» 191. Selner, analysing this proposal of Aquinas, 
says that the determination of esse by the predicamentals is not an instance of 
the actualisation of certain potentialities of esse. Rather esse is the foundation of 
actuality and the base of subsequent possible perfections 192.
188 Fabro, 2009, p. 331.
189 Cfr. García LóPez, j., «Analogía de la noción de acto según santo Tomás», Anuario Filosófico, 6 
(1973) 164-165.
190 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 7 a. 2 ad 9 (Ad nonum dicendum, quod hoc quod dico esse est inter omnia 
perfectissimum: quod ex hoc patet quia actus est semper perfectior potentia)
191 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 7 a. 2 ad 9 (Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et 
propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum)
192 Cfr. SeLner, 1998, p. 153.
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However, Esse is not only the Ultimate Perfection but also the Real Per-
fection. It is what in Metaphysics merits the name God. The Divine Being 
(Esse Divinum) is however not the highest of a hierarchy of the perfection 
of being. It is the unique perfection that subsists in and by itself. All other be-
ings (esse creatum), and as such perfections, subsist or exist by virtue of Esse 
Divinum. According to our view, the nucleus of the metaphysical realism in 
the discussion of the Divine Creation lies in the fact that there is not any hi-
erarchy of being either between God and the creature or within the created 
being.
If we take the literal connotation of the definition by Aquinas of Esse as 
the «actuality of all acts, and on account of this, the perfection of all perfec-
tions», we have not much remedy but to conclude that this Esse is not only 
unique but real because it is actuality. It can only be said of God. The created 
being cannot be the actuality of all acts because it is not the actuality of the 
Pure Act. It therefore falls short of the universality that solely pertains to the 
Divine Act of Being.
Therefore there is not any hierarchy of perfection between the Divine 
Being and the created being. The two realties are radically distinguished by 
the idea of Createdness. According to this notion, there is not any common 
being between God and the created Universe. What can be said is that the 
created being or the created existence is a semblance of God who is Existence 
per se ipsa. The characteristic of universal creation that is similar to God who 
is its cause is existence but created, what is called the created being 193. This is in 
fact an employment of the original postulate of Aristotle 194.
Pérez Guerrero, corroborating the radicalism of the distinction between 
the existence of God and that of creation, affirms that the Divine Being is sep-
arated while created being is dependent: «It is one thing to say that the Divine 
Being is separated and another to say that the Divine Being is the separated 
being. When one says that the Divine Being is separated, it is not necessarily 
considered as capable of any union or composition, while when one says that 
the Divine Being is the separated being, yes one foresees the possibility of 
union or composition, given that, in any other manner, this expression loses 
193 Cfr. S.Th., Ia q. 44 a. 1 c. (Et iterum ostensum est quod esse subsistens non potest esse nisi unum: sicut 
si albedo esset subsistens, non posset esse nisi una, cum albedines multiplicentur secundum recipientia. 
Relinquitur ergo quod omnia alia a Deo non sint suum esse, sed participant esse)
194 Cfr. Metaphysics, II, 1, 993b20.
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its meaning» 195. This author continues to say that according to the misguided 
doctrine of the Separated being, the perfection of being is internally divided 
into the Divine being and the created being. The two beings are solely distin-
guished by a limitation which is the effect of composition.
One question now begs a response: Can there be any metaphysical spec-
ulative discussion around the hierarchy of perfection given that the Divine Be-
ing and the created being are absolutely separate? We affirm the positive save 
for the fact that the metaphysical science in which the Divine Being and the 
created being are considered two separate realities is primordial with respect 
to the speculation of the hierarchy of perfection. The metaphysical debate re-
garding the notion of ‘being’ is beyond that of the predicamentals 196. For this 
reason, Metaphysics distinguishes between the two natures of existence before 
we can apply any categories to any one of the two. Aquinas does not obstinate-
ly maintain the position that ‘being’ is certain perfection to which God and 
creatures can be attributed variably. He recognizes the causal relationship that 
exists between God and the creature. He, for example, says that though God 
as the first cause does not enter into the essence of the creatures, the being 
which is in creatures cannot be understood except as derived from the Divine 
Being 197. He qualifies this statement which, at first glance demonstrates cer-
tain pantheistic elements 198, by affirming that the relationship between God 
and the creatures is properly speaking one of cause and effect 199.
195 Pérez Guerrero, 1996, p. 35.
196 The metaphysical discussion regarding the notion of ‘being’ goes beyond that of the predicaments. 
For this reason, Metaphysics must clarify what ‘being’ is before we can apply any categories to it. 
According to Aristotle there are 10 real manners of being into which universal reality is reduced 
–the substance and nine accidents–. The ten genres are what we call predicaments or categories. 
The nine accidents are: quality, quantity, relation, place, position, possession, time, action and 
passion. Given this classification of the nature of being of universal reality and the Metaphysics of 
the Divine Creation based upon the idea of Createdness that we hereby put forward, we conclude 
that the predicaments of Aristotle cannot apply to the Divine Being as they apply to the created 
being (See Metaphysics, v). These predicaments must therefore be studied under the subject of the 
Created being, which implies, taking into consideration the inherent notion of Createdness.
197 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 5 ad 1: «Although the first cause, which is God, does not enter into the 
essence of creatures, yet the being which is in creatures cannot be understood except as derived 
from the divine being, just as a proper effect cannot be understood except as derived from its 
proper cause».
198 By making a contrast between the premise, that the Divine Essence does not enter into that of 
creatures, and the conclusion, that the being of creatures derives from divine being, he seems to 
imply that divine being does in some way enter into the being of creatures.
199 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 5 ad 1.
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The arguments in favour of the metaphysical hierarchy of universal re-
ality are preceded by the distinction between the Esse Divinum and the esse 
creatum. The pure perfections such as being, life, will, intellect, unity, truth, 
goodness and beauty 200, cannot express the nature of God in the same man-
ner as they describe the created reality. The transcendental nature of these 
perfections in the created Nature is really pre-defined by the idea of Creat-
edness.
d) The Ens per se and the ens per aliud of Avicenna
The third argument alluded to by Aquinas in the Q.D.P., question 3 arti-
cle 5 is that of Avicenna. It is our view that this is perhaps the most outstand-
ing argument that argues for the idea of Createdness as the most universal 
attribute of all reality distinct from God. Here Avicenna presents the specula-
tion of two distinct real beings of which the Universal reality is made up:
1) That being which is through self (Ens per se ipsa), and
2) That which is through another (ens per aliud).
He says that the real being whose existence depends upon another is 
reduced as to a cause to that which is through self. The causal being, by defini-
tion, subsists «through itself» 201. The argument of Avicenna presents a novelty 
to the notion of Participation. He brings together the Platonic Participation 
perspective and the Aristotle notion of Causality. He employs the example of 
heat to illustrate this: «If there were one heat existing per se ipsa, it would be 
necessary that it be the cause of all hot things which have heat by way of par-
ticipation». As a consequence, is formulated the notion of the Participation by 
Causality.
To say that the First Causal Being is «its own being» implies that it 
must be: the Pure and Simple Act (non-composed). All other beings dis-
tinct from the First Being are therefore not their own being but, through 
participation, are by 202 that one being. Furthermore, Avicenna cements the 
200 Cfr. GonzáLez, 2000, p. 117.
201 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 5 co.
202 The use of the preposition ‘by’ is critical. The participation spoken of by Avicenna is not a 
participation ‘of’ the being of the First Being. It is rather participation in a semblance which is 
caused by the First Being. It is therefore participation ‘by’ which makes implicit reference to the 
Principle of Causality.
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ground for the universality of the idea of Createdness when he, as Aquinas 
gives evidence, says: «Hence it is necessary that all other beings which are 
not their own being, but have being by way of participation, are by that one 
being» 203.
The Universal reality consequently is distinctly either the Divine Being 
or the created being. The relationship between these two realities is not ac-
cording to a hierarchy or order of perfection but rather through a participa-
tive association. This participation is however not a continuum but a discrete 
relation because it is participation by causal action. The created being partic-
ipates in its own existence because the Divine Being, Existence per se, causes 
this created existence to be. As Aquinas explains in Summa contra Gentiles, that 
attribute which is proper to the nature of a particular subject per se cannot 
be separated from this subject because this separation would de-substantiate 
it. On the other, if in a particular subject is found an attribute which, though 
separated from it, does not affect the integrity of this subject, it follows that 
this attribute is not essential to the nature of this subject 204. Applying this logic 
to the Divine Creation we see that the creatural attribute, that is the created 
being or created existence is essential to creatures but not to God, while the 
Existence of God is essential to both God and the creatures. For this reason, 
we affirm that the attribute by which God and creatures exist must essentially 
(metaphysically) be distinct because what is said of creatures as regards being 
or existing cannot be said of God; that creatures intrinsically depend upon the 
Other in order to be.
We have begun this sub-section of our Dissertation with two principal 
objectives. Firstly, we have desired to bring the idea of Createdness to the 
fore-front of the discussion around the Metaphysics of the Divine Creation 
through a appraisal of the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. This debate around 
the idea of Createdness is the central theme of the Fifth article of the third 
question of Q.D.P. Indeed Createdness, a novel concept, acquires a universal 
connotation in Metaphysics. Through Aristotle and Avicenna we see how the 
new principle is supported by two inseparable conceptual pillars –Participation 
and Causality–.
203 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 5 co.
204 Cfr. S.c.G., lib. II cap. 15 n. 3.
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In contrast, the Platonic view of Participation cannot stand on its own in 
the Metaphysics of the Divine Creation. Our second objective for that matter 
has been to demonstrate this. The Notion of Participation according to Plato 
and the Neo-Platonism considers ‘being’ a common perfection which pertains 
to the Divinity in plenitude and to the Universal creation by defect. However 
this degradation of being is contrary to the realism stipulated by the meta-
physical truth. Createdness does not in any way imply imperfection. It rather 
makes reference to the state of existence of creatures which is fundamental 
dependence upon their Creator. The created being is not perfect in a deroga-
tory manner but properly so according to its own existence. The postulates of 
Aristotle and Avicenna are therefore a solid foundation for an advance in the 
Aquinas Metaphysics of the Divine Creation.
3. the divine creation aS reLation
The Divine Creation does not pertain to the predicament (category) of 
action – passion. Rather it is a relation «of the creature to the Creator from 
whom it receives being». Properly speaking, the effect of the Divine Creation 
is not any created entity but an inherent aspect of the reality of the creature. 
Aquinas affirms that the Divine Creation no more than realizes a relation with 
the Creator.
The exposition and demonstration of the creature fundamentally as a 
relation, therefore, becomes the objective of this sub-chapter. Corresponding 
to this objective is the exposition of the limitations and errors that arise from 
a conception of the creature as merely a ‘thing’, an entity or object, concepts 
which entail such particularity that they become inadequate for a proper com-
prehension of the effect of the Divine Creation. Two traditional philosophical 
errors intimately connected with the comprehension of the creature as certain 
particularity, become objects of study in this sub-chapter.
1) The Problem of the Unconditional Transcendence rooted in Plato-
nism;
2) The view of the Universal Reality as mere transformation in the met-
aphysical tenets of Aristotle.
As earlier mentioned, these errors largely draw from the view of the crea-
ture as a particular entity. Bound to this is the lack of comprehension of the 
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nature of the Divine Act of creation which is a Perfect Act without any inter-
mediary stages. It consequently becomes necessary to:
1) Study the nature of this relation which is the creature;
2) Distinguish ‘relation’ from ‘entity’, and
3) Demonstrate the limitation of the view of the creatures as a mere 
particularity for the correct metaphysical justification of the notion of 
the Divine Creation;
a) Passivity in the Divine Creation
The aim of this study is to demonstrate that the Divine Creation has a 
real and lasting or permanent metaphysical effect upon the creature. Aqui-
nas defines ‘creature’ as the general name of the real relation of that which 
proceeds from God 205. The effect of the Divine Creation is of a metaphysical 
nature. It is fundamentally the Created Relation. This means that the crea-
ture, in the absence and without sustenance of the Divine Creation, naturally 
annihilates into the Non-being. «The idea of creation corresponds to the idea 
of a total dependence, transcendental and extra-temporal in nature, of being 
in relation to its cause. This very idea is termed relation» 206. Indeed it is our 
opinion that the study of the question of Relation in the Divine Creation 
holds the key to the comprehension of this Divine Act. Small wonder why St. 
Thomas Aquinas dedicates the Third article to the question of «Creation as 
relation» 207.
We have already seen that the Divine Creation is the production of sub-
stantial being by God. This substantial being is through an act of existence, 
the created act of being. We shall now study what kind of relation this created 
being possesses with respect to God its Creator. Indeed one may informally 
ask: To whom belongs the acknowledgment of attribute of creation, to God 
or to the creature? Moreover, is the relation between God and the creature 
direct or mediate? The questions posed are not straightforward. Philosophical 
205 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 3 ad 2 (Haec autem relatio, creatura quaedam est, accepto communiter nomine 
creaturae pro omni eo quod est a Deo)
206 oSuna Fernández-LarGo, a., «Cuestión sobre la creación: Introducción», in Santo Tomás de 
Aquino. Opúsculos y cuestiones selectas (III), A. Osuna Fernández-Largo (ed.), Biblioteca de Autores 
Cristianos, Madrid 2005, p. 264.
207 Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 3 tit. 1
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errors have arisen due to the unreserved attribution of the reality of the Divine 
Creation to God –what we hereby called the problem of the Unconditional 
Transcendence–.
Two false conclusions made as a result of the error of the Uncondition-
al Transcendence with respect to the interpretation of the Divine Creation 
are:
a) The exclusive attribution of the reality of the Divine Creation to God 
with total disregard of the creature results in unsatisfactory justifica-
tions regarding the original relationship between God and the crea-
ture. As a consequence, there is a rational imperative to introduce 
the hypothesis of semi-creative beings that preserve the mentioned 
relationship.
b) On the other hand, when the Divine Creation is attributed uniquely 
to the creature not only does the metaphysical error of the Eternal 
Creation become very imminent, but also there is also the disregard 
of the divine origin of creation 208.
Nevertheless it must be affirmed that the truth of the Divine Creation 
not only is compatible with the transcendence of God as well as the reality of 
the creature. St. Thomas Aquinas outlines various arguments to demonstrate 
this compatibility:
– The direct and immediate relation extant in the Divine Creation.
– The Activity and Passivity of the Divine Creation.
– The con-creation of relation in the Divine Creation.
b) The Provider – Recipient Argument
A postulate in Liber de Causis asserts that from an entity another cannot 
receive that which is greater than the original provider:
– Be it according to the means according to which the power or capacity 
itself is bequeathed, or
– According to the manner in which the recipient receives this capa-
city 209.
208 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 3 arg. 2.
209 Cfr. aquinaS, t., In Liber de Causis expositio, Marietti Editori, Turin 1955, p. 67.
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Basing itself upon this postulate, one argument affirms that the creative 
act of God is consequently received into the Pure Non-being which is the only 
possible recipient of this act. It is subsequently and erroneously concluded 
that the Divine Creation does not establish any real relation in the creature 210. 
In his response to this argument, Aquinas affirms that the Pure Non-being is 
not the recipient of the Divine Creation rather «that which is created» 211. As 
Aquinas argues, the notion of the Divine Creation presents a great difficulty 
for the finite human intellect which by its nature requires sensitive material 
reality for the acquisition of knowledge 212. The Provider-Recipient postulate 
happens to be strongly founded on the supposition of movement in the Ma-
terial Universe.
Consequent to this error, the Non-being is viewed as a recipient of the 
act of Divine Creation. «Divine Creation marks the commencement of be-
ing as well as the establishment of the relation with the Creator from whom 
the creature receives being. Therefore the Divine Creation is nothing more 
than a certain relation to God together with a novelty of being» 213 affirms St. 
Thomas Aquinas regarding the nature of the Divine Creation. In the Summa 
contra Gentiles, our author uses similar terms when he describes the Divine 
Creation as: «(...) the very dependence of created being on the principle 
which originally causes it; for this reason creation pertains to the category 
of relation» 214.
Therefore the principal attributes that surround the question of Relation 
in the Divine Creation are:
1) The Novelty of being;
2) The relation of the Creator to the creature;
3) The permanent and stable dependence of this relation.
210 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 3 arg. 1.
211 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 3 ad 1 (Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in creatione non ens non se habet sicut 
recipiens divinam actionem, sed id quod creatum est, ut supra dictum est)
212 Cfr. aquinaS, 1955, p. 69 (Propositio 10, n. 249).
213 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 3 co. (unde in ipsa creatione non importatur aliquis accessus ad esse, nec transmutatio 
a creante, sed solummodo inceptio essendi, et relatio ad creatorem a quo esse habet; et sic creatio nihil est 
aliud realiter quam relatio quaedam ad Deum cum novitate essendi)
214 Cfr. S.c.G., lib. II cap. 18 n. 2 (Non enim est creatio mutatio, sed ipsa dependentia esse creati ad 
principium a quo statuitur. Et sic est de genere relationis)
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In the Divine Creation, creatures neither act nor receive an action, but 
rather attain a relation with God who is the principle of their being. The es-
sence of Divine Creation is this relation 215.
With regard to the category of relation, the Angelic Doctor confirms the 
real nature of the relation between God and the creature established in the 
Divine Creation. This relation is direct and immediate. For this reason, there 
is not any incessant sequence in this relation 216.
c) The Divine Creation as a perfect realized act
«This relation that is a creature... does not proceed to infinity because the 
relation of creation does not refer to God through another real relation but 
rather in se. A relation does not make reference to anything through another 
relation» 217. In this section of the Doctorate Dissertation, it is once again im-
portant to highlight the fact that the Divine Creation is not movement. It is an 
instantaneous and immediate act. It is for this reason called the Perfect Act be-
cause it lacks any intermediary stages. It is worth noting that if the instantaneous 
nature of the Divine Creation fails to be underscored, the real and direct nature 
of the relation established by this act cannot properly be explained.
1) The Divine Creation in the active sense makes reference to the active 
power of God as its subject. The act of the Divine Creation here un-
derstood cannot be but uncreated and therefore transcendent.
215 Cfr. PoPe, S., «Neither enemy nor friend: nature as creation in the theology of St. Thomas 
Aquinas», Zygon, 32 (1997) 223.
216 Cfr. S.c.G., lib. II cap. 18 n. 4 (Ex hoc autem apparet vanitas impugnantium creationem per rationes 
sumptas ex natura motus vel mutationis: utpote quod oportet creationem, sicut ceteros motus vel 
mutationes, esse in aliquo subiecto; et quod oportet non esse transmutari in esse. Non enim est creatio 
mutatio, sed ipsa dependentia esse creati ad principium a quo statuitur. Et sic est de genere relationis. 
Unde nihil prohibet eam in creato esse sicut in subiecto. Videtur tamen creatio esse mutatio quaedam 
secundum modum intelligendi tantum: inquantum scilicet intellectus noster accipit unam et eandem 
rem ut non existentem prius, et postea existentem. Apparet autem, si creatio relatio quaedam est, quod 
res quaedam est: et neque increata est; neque alia relatione creata. Cum enim effectus creatus realiter 
dependeat a creante, oportet huiusmodi relationem eesse rem quandam. – Omnis autem res a Deo in 
esse producitur. Est igitur in esse a Deo producta. – Non tamen alia creatione creata quam ipsa creatura 
prima quae per eam creata dicitur. Quia accidentia et formae, sicut per se non sunt, ita nec per se creantur, 
cum creatio sit productio entis: sed, sicut in alio sunt, ita aliis creatis creantur. – Praeterea. Relatio non 
refertur per aliam relationem, quia sic esset abire infertur, quia essentialiter relatio est. Non igitur alia 
creatione opus est, qua ipsa creatio creetur, et sic in infinitum)
217 Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 3 ad 2 (Haec autem relatio... nec oportet procedere in infinitum, quia creationis relatio 
non referetur ad Deum alia relatione reali, sed ipsa)
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2) In the passive sense, the Divine Creation can only fall attribute to real 
passive power of the creature which experiences a novelty of being 
because God does not possesses any passive power which can acquire 
such innovation which resembles the process of change by reason of 
novelty 218.
concLuSionS
«Without wonder, men and women would lapse into deadening routine 
and little by little would become incapable of a life which is genuinely person-
al», says Blessed John Paul II in Fides et ratio (1998, 4). The initial glimmer of 
knowledge arises from wonder. Wonder is not that of any innate or primordial 
mental notions or ideas as the Cartesian philosophers thought. It is rather the 
marvel and the contemplation of the Universal Reality. It is the intellectual 
acknowledgement of the fact of the Creation; that the World does not fully 
explain itself. The question of the Universal Creation marks the foremost 
commencement of the intellectual inquisition of man.
One of the most excellent materializations of the contribution of the 
Christian Doctrine upon the Rational Speculation is the truth of the Divine 
Creation. With St. Thomas Aquinas, the philosophical study of the Notion 
of Creation, a concept born within the precincts of the Truth of the Divine 
Revelation, reaches unprecedented heights (and probably unsurpassed since 
then!). It, in effect, achieves the status of a metaphysical notion. We thus speak 
of the Metaphysics of the Divine Creation.
In the First Chapter of this Dissertation we have seen how a possible 
compatibility can be achieved among:
1) The Physics and Metaphysics of Aristotle guided by the postulate – 
Ex nihilo, nihil fit;
2) The negation by the Cosmological Science of the thesis that the 
Universe, the rationally-structured Cosmos, can come from the 
Nothingness (according to a misunderstanding of the Divine Crea-
tion maxim – Creatio ex nihilo), and
218 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 3 ad 2. St. Thomas Aquinas, as he frankly admits, cannot totally avoid 
demonstrating such analogy that exists between the Divine Creation as an aquisition (the novelty 
of being) and the Change as an acquisition of a form. (Si vero consideretur secundum suam rationem, 
prout ex actione agentis innascitur praedicta relatio, sic est quodammodo prior subiecto, sicut ipsa divina 
actio, est eius causa proxima)
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3) The Creation Thesis forwarded by Aquinas that describes the Divine 
Creation of the Universe from nothing as the manner of acting by God 
who is the Pure Act and as such (in the absence of any potency what-
soever) naturally produces existence.
The axiom: From nothing, nothing comes to be comes to bear the affirmative 
testimony to the fact that the created Universal Being must actually proceed 
from what is. It cannot come from what is not. The idea of the Non-being, 
therefore, is rejected as a possible causal factor of the Universe because the 
impossibility of something arising from what is not (the Non-being) is evi-
dent. Only one alternative consequently remains: «things come into being 
out of existent things, i.e. out of things already present» 219. Consequently, the 
universal existence must be attributed to that which already exists. This affir-
mation becomes vital to the positive perception of the ex nihilo dictum which 
negates the possibility of the Nothingness as the original source of anything 
existent 220.
On the other hand, Aristotle’s Thesis of the Eternal Existence of the 
Substance is an impediment to the employment of his Metaphysics in the de-
scription of the Divine Creation. Indeed according to Aristotle the Non-being 
is only an accidental principle. In the Ex nihilo, nihil fit postulate, the Noth-
ingness is understood not in an absolute sense but rather as an accidental pri-
vation that the Substance temporally experiences. What is nothing is actually 
something different from what is desired. For this reason, nothing is really a 
privation or qua what is not. Nevertheless when Aquinas describes the Divine 
Creation, his is unambiguous that this involves the production of the Univer-
sality of the Creatures in their most fundamental existence 221.
How then does Aquinas bridge the deficient Aristotle Metaphysics with 
the new Christian Truth Elements that implore a metaphysical explanation? 
The Law of Similarity, omne agens agit sibi simile is what metaphysically de-
scribes how any active agent acts. God is an active agent; he is the Pure Act. 
Through the use of analogy, therefore, we can arrive at a somewhat reasonable 
understanding of the nature of the Divine Action. Nevertheless, there are two 
variant positions regarding what sibi simile actually means.
219 Cfr. Physics, I, 4, 188a19.
220 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 1 ad 7.
221 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 1 co.
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According to Wippel, the Law of Similitude in Aquinas justifies the fact 
that our cognition of God though imperfect, can be real and positive because 
the names that designate pure perfections such as wisdom, goodness and be-
ing, are names that are attributed to God properly and not metaphorically, 
through the similarity to their human connotation 222. For Rosemann, omne 
agens agit sibi simile is «a principle which ensures that even the greatest degree 
of difference or dissimilitude between diverse elements of the Cosmos can 
never become an absolute otherness» 223.
Reformulating the Ex nihilo, nihil fit postulate as follows: From existence, 
existence proceeds; we see how the explanation of the Universal Action plays 
testimony to the Law of Causal Similitude.
The Law of the Natural Action, omne agens agit secundum quod in actu 224, 
is the other governing maxim of the Universal Active Agent Action. An agent 
acts insofar as it is in act: The Universal Action is attributable to the agent’s 
possession of the act, fundamentally understood as the act of being or existing 
(esse). Consequently, the Law of the Natural Action is based upon the fact that 
all agents, by their simple real existence, act according to their possession of 
esse 225. The fact that the agent cause fundamental acts in a singular way, that 
is, according to existence means that its effect is a similitude of it by the mere 
fact that it exists! This explains the fact that the Universe has an ontological 
dependence upon God precisely through the Divine Creation. The World is 
therefore not ontologically eternal as Aristotle affirmed.
Does God possess power to create the Universe or not? Having estab-
lished that the World, through the Divine Creation is sustained in an ontolog-
ical dependence upon the Creator, we have now come to focus on the nature 
of the Creative Power in God. Aquinas affirms that God has created the Uni-
verse not by natural necessity but rather «by the decree of his will» 226. From 
this declaration arises the Principle of the Free and Intelligent Creation as a 
First Principle of the Divine Agent Action. The Principle of the Metaphysical 
222 Cfr. wiPPeL, 2007, p. 154.
223 Cfr. roSemann, 1996, pp. 22-23.
224 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 1 co.
225 Cfr. wiPPeL, 2007, p. 166: «that each and every thing acts insofar as it is in act – Thomas 
seems to base this on the common sense view that if something is to produce something else in 
actuality, it must itself exist in actuality».
226 Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 15 co.
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Act (that God is an Active Agent through omne agens agit secundum quod in actu 
and omne agens agit sibi simile), though successful explains the Divine Potency 
to create, does not in anyway insinuate that this action is contingent to God. 
Moreover the Classical Neo-platonic axiom Bonum diffusivum sui sustains the 
thesis that the Goodness naturally propagates itself. As St. Augustine puts it, 
«Because God is good, we are» 227.
Consequent the act of the Divine Creation is mistakenly understood as 
a necessary emanation from God. The Latin Avicenna takes up this thesis 
and, incorporating the Law of Singularity (that each one and simple cause 
can only produce a unique effect) arrives at the conclusion that the Divine 
Creation is the necessary external causal action of God. Indeed the guiding 
Principle of Avicenna is that attributes are necessary consequences of the es-
sence. The causal attribute in God is a necessary consequence of the Divine 
Essence.
Aquinas, fortified with the knowledge of the Revealed Truth that holds 
that God is the Free and Personal Being, navigates through the metaphysical 
synthesis of the Free Creation and the fact that the Good is self-diffusive. He 
does not always and in a clear-cut manner circumvent the necessary emanative 
implications of the axiom Bonum diffusivum sui. The Divine Simplicity means 
that God’s will is identical with His very essence. The principal object of the 
Divine Will is the Divine Essence 228. The primary object of God’s under-
standing is the Divine Essence. It therefore follows that the Divine Essence is 
the primary object of the Divine Will. According to the thesis of the Perfect 
Identification of the Divine Essence and Will Aquinas philosophically sustains 
the fact that the Divine Will moves itself in a natural and necessary fashion to-
wards the Divine Essence. This conclusion of course does not leave any room 
for the rational sustenance of the free-willing by God of an eternal reality to 
Him as is the case of the created Universe.
Nonetheless, we read further ahead in the Summa contra Gentiles that 
that God wills, not the goodness found in other realities but rather wills other 
realities to be 229. The goodness found in these realities pre-supposes their real 
existence and God gives this existence through the free and intelligent crea-
227 De Doctirna Christiana, I, 32.
228 S.c.G., lib. I cap. 74 n. 1.
229 S.c.G., lib. I cap. 81 n. 4: «God in willing His own goodness, wills things other than Himself to 
be in so far as they participate in His goodness».
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tion. The question as to why God would give real existence to these realities 
(to create) consequently does not remain unanswered.
The Transcendental Goodness is perfection, but it is always an attribute 
of being. For this reason, Bonum diffusivum sui describes the perfective nature 
of the Good upon the reality but does not explain how this reality comes to 
be. Aquinas can therefore truly sustain that, through the Divine Creation, the 
Universe comes to be intelligently and freely.
In the turn of events, Aquinas can be said to arrive at such affirmation 
that: Bonum diffusivum sui in bona re 230. That is: The Good is perfection that is 
said not of itself but of real things insofar as they possess it. Aquinas, guided 
by the Law of Similarity, understands that the created reality is said to be 
good because it is the effect of the Divine Causal Agent. According to the 
Cause-effect relationship of the principle omne agens agit sibi simile, there is a 
pre-containment, similarity and influx of the effect in the cause. The good must 
therefore pre-exist in God for it to be said of the Created being; the perfection 
present in an effect is a certain likeness of its agent because every agent pro-
duces something its likeness. Indeed it is the Law of Similitude that provides the 
ultimate guiding principle in order to affirm that good in itself does not pro-
duce as an efficient causality but rather than an agent which possesses goodness 
transmits this perfection to its effect.
Nevertheless, in the order of the Cause-effect relationship, the Agent 
Cause is really present in its effect because it is somewhat ordered to it:
1) Because an agent produces its likeness and so perpetuates its species in 
what Rosemann denotes as the Law of Synonymy 231;
2) Because the agent is itself moved by another, and
3) Because the agent perfects itself in producing the effect.
Given the fact that God only possesses a rational relation to the created 
Universe 232, it can then be concluded that the action by which this Universe 
comes to be is not a transitive action by God. How can this be? God does not 
have a real relation with the created Universe. At the same time, the very act 
of the Divine Creation as we have seen is immediate, instantaneous and direct. 
230 The perfection goodness is said to be diffusive in so far as this perfection is found in the Created 
reality (good things). Goodness in itself therefore does not produce the created reality but is simply 
found in them or perfects them.
231 Cfr. roSemann, 1996, pp. 52-57.
232 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 3 co.
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When Aquinas, affirms that God acts without any intermediary 233, he effec-
tively denies any transitive action in God 234. Therefore if the Divine Action 
is by nature immanent, that is non-transitive, how does Aquinas resolve the 
question of the Divine Creation which by definition involves the production 
of being distinct from God’s?
Selner notes that if Divine Creation is not the result of a transitive action 
then the Created being is not produced at all 235. In this very denial is an im-
plicit claim that the Creative act is not ultimately ordered to the production of 
creatures, but rather for sake of the Divine Goodness: «Creatures are indeed 
a result of this activity, but God’s act is not ordered to them as such, but to 
his own goodness... God is his own end. As a purely actual being he and his 
activity can be ordered to only one thing, and that is himself. His activity may 
be productive of something other, but that other is not in itself the end of this 
activity. Further, in creation there is no ‘other’ which receives God’s act and is 
perfected by it, as in a transitive act. The other is rather wholly constituted by 
this act» 236.
«By distinguishing between the logical relation of God to the creature 
and the real relation of the creature to God; by maintaining the ‘immanence’ 
of God’s activity, Thomas avoids the ‘contamination’ so feared by Avicenna... 
Thus God’s radical otherness is preserved and our understating of it is en-
hanced by facing up to the challenge it seems to come under in holding for 
creation» 237. Therefore, the Divine Creative Act cannot is not incorporable in 
the Aristotelian definition of the Transitive action.
The Divine Being is a radically distinct thing from the created being. 
God is not simply the separated nature of a common being (esse commune) 
while creatures are this being but in a composition of esse and essentia. No, the 
Divine Being is separated while the created being is composed. They are two 
totally different manners of existence. Pérez Guerrero highlights this radical-
ism of the distinction between the Existence of God and that of the Creatures: 
233 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 7 a. 10 co.
234 Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 15 co.
235 Cfr. SeLner, 1998, pp. 249-250.
236 SeLner, 1998, pp. 250-251. Selner makes reference to the definition of the Transitive action as 
«any action which consists in the production of an effect» whereby consists in necessarily means 
finalised in. Therefore to deny that the creative action is transitive is to deny that it consist in the 
production of creatures as this were the unique rationale of this Divine Action.
237 SeLner, 1998, p. 252.
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«It is one thing to say that the Divine Being is separated and another to say that 
the Divine Being is the separated being. When one says that the Divine Being 
is separated, it is not necessarily considered as capable of any union or compo-
sition, while when one says that the Divine Being is the separated being, yes 
one foresees the possibility of union or composition, given that, in any other 
manner, this expression loses its meaning» 238. At the heart of this distinction is 
the foundation of a critique of the thesis that the Universal Reality is a mere 
hierarchy of the Perfection of the Common being 239. Between God and the 
creatures there is dissimilarity in the nature of existence. This is what is meant 
by the Absolute Transcendence of God from the created Universe.
However the classical notion of Participation becomes an impediment 
in order to articulate the Unconditional Transcendent Existence of God. In 
Platonism, the ideas of Commonness and Participation seem to go hand in hand. 
This is because the very possibility of attributing any common property to 
reality means that each entity of reality must possess this property but only 
partially. If any particular being were to possess it fully, then this property 
would no longer be common. In fact precisely in this lies the magnificent 
and fine distinction between the notions of Commonness and Participation. If a 
certain being, A, fully possess a certain property, P, and another being, B, also 
possesses the same property, then P is not common to A and B given that A 
does not share in P but possesses it fully. It is B therefore that participates in P. 
The distinction between the Commonness and the Participation is so radical 
that it can be truly affirmed that the nature of P in A is completely distinct from 
the nature of P in B 240.
It is necessary to make evermore present the notion of Createdness as the 
fundamental proposal of the Metaphysics of the Divine Creation. The radical 
real distinction between the Divine Being and the Created being deters any 
tendency to comprehend being as a certain perfection whose commonness is 
not only pertinent to creatures but applies to God as well in the most perfect 
manner. Te velde well explains the understanding by the classical Platonism 
of Participation: «What is the meaning of ‘participation’? Thomas begins with 
238 Pérez Guerrero, 1996, p. 35.
239 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 5 co.
240 For this reason when we speak of the dissimilarity between the Being of God and that of the 
created reality, it is proper to speak of ‘distinction’ rather than ‘difference’ so as to further 
highlight this infinite disparity in order of reality between God and the Creation.
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a kind of etymological explanation: «to participate is, as it were, to take a part 
of something» (partem capere). This is what the term ‘participation’ means. 
We may therefore speak of participation, Thomas goes on, when something 
receives (or: has) in particular fashion what belongs to another universally. 
Thus when a characteristic or perfection is possessed by a subject in only a 
partial or particular fashion, such a subject can be said to participate in that 
perfection. The subject in question is not identical with the perfection it pos-
sesses, which leaves the possibility open for other subjects to share in that 
same perfection» 241.
The above view which advances an understanding of certain «common-
ness of the perfection of being» and consequent participation of the perfec-
tion of being by creatures through deterioration has a strong Neo-platonic 
heritage especially in Boethius. Elements of this thought-position are heavily 
adopted by St. Thomas Aquinas.
Regarding the concept of the Supreme Being (Ens Maxime) in Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics and later taken up in the Metaphysics of the Divine Creation, 
Selner affirms that this Being cannot be comprehended according to a hierar-
chy of perfection; as the culmination of the common but ordered perfection of 
being. The Supreme Being does not mean the most perfect in the scale or gra-
dation of reality but rather an entirely different order of reality 242. «Those things 
which have being ‘more or less’ must have it from that which has being in the 
highest degree» demonstrates the absence of a hierarchy of the perfection of 
being in reality. There is a radical distinction between the Divine Being and 
the Created being.
In point of fact there is a considerable difference between the excerpt 
of the S.c.G. and that of the S.Th. regarding the Fourth Way of the demon-
stration of the existence of God. In the former citation, the notion of the 
Transcendental Causality is absent. Its argument therefore remains within the 
realm of the Platonic Participation and inevitable adheres to the Hypothesis 
of the «hierarchy of the perfection of common being» 243. We observe the lack 
of a clear-cut metaphysical distinction between the Highest Being (Esse Sim-
pliciter or Ens Maxime) and the Created being. The absence of any reference to 
241 te veLde, 1995, p. 11.
242 Cfr. SeLner, 1998, p. 36.
243 Cfr. S.c.G., lib. I cap. 13 n. 34.
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the Notion of Causality in the excerpt of S.c.G. is observable in the adoption 
of the Aristotle reflection by Aquinas 244. The exclusion of the Notion of Cau-
sality in the rationalization of the Divine Creation deters the proper employ-
ment of the Platonic Notion of Participation in the Metaphysics of the Divine 
Creation. On the other hand, in the S.Th. Aquinas introduces the Transcen-
dental Causality. Through this, he is able to describe God, the Divine Being, 
as the Supreme Being not because He is simply the highest in a hierarchy 
of perfections, but rather because Ens Maxime, the Uncreated Being, is the 
«principle and cause» 245 of the Universal Creation 246.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the philosophical works of St. Thom-
as Aquinas cannot be considered unimpeachable. The absence during the Me-
dieval Ages of the modern-day advancements in the science of Cosmology as 
well as the present-day profound study of the Personhood etc. is an obvious 
limitation of the intellectual quest of the Middle Ages. As such, the written 
thought of Aquinas does not lack deficiencies and shortcomings, even errors! 
Nevertheless, the philosophical foundations and the outlook of the Angelic 
Doctor, as well as his exemplar realistic, synthetic and harmonious search for 
the Truth is a perennial step forward for the Inceptum Philosophíæ.
244 Cfr. Q.D.P., q. 3 a. 5 co.
245 Cfr. GonzáLez, 2000, p. 115 (Footnote 139).
246 Cfr. S.Th., Ia q. 2 a. 3 c. 
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